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Abstract 
 
It is readily assumed that the average level of living in Indonesia deteriorated during the 
hectic period 1940-1950. Much of the evidence on economic change during this period is 
anecdotal. It is difficult to distil a general impression from it. Per capita food consumption 
is an important indicator of the average standard of living. For that reason this paper 
monitors the changes in food production, distribution and supply in the densely populated 
core island of Java in Indonesia. 
 Food supply was adequate in Indonesia when the Japanese attack on the country 
started in 1941. During 1944-1948 per capita food supply was at a very low level in Java. 
In the years 1943-1945 the low level was caused by the restrictions imposed by the 
Japanese authorities on the domestic trade of food products, and by the coercive system of 
purchasing rice for distribution. Both created disincentives for farmers to produce a food 
surplus. Similar reasons explain the situation during the years 1946-1948. Moreover, the 
controversy between the returning colonial government and the government of the 
nationalist Republic of Indonesia impeded free shipments of food between the food 
deficient urban areas and the food producing rural areas. Food supply recovered during 
1948-1950, with the economic re-integration of most of Indonesia.  
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Preface to the second edition 
 
The first edition of this paper was published as a book by the Centre for South-East Asian 
Studies at the University of Hull in 1994 (ISBN 0-85958-832-7). The Centre no longer 
exists; it was transferred to the Department of East Asian Studies at the University of Leeds 
in 2003. The book is no longer in print. Some copies are available from second-hand 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 1940s formed a hectic decade of change in the history of Indonesia. In March 1942 
the Japanese military forces ended Dutch colonial rule. Until August 1945 the country 
was ruled by the Japanese, who initially tried to incorporate the country in the Japanese 
war economy. Between September 1945 and December 1949 the Indonesian archipelago 
was torn by the feud between the returning Dutch colonial government and the nationalist 
Republic of Indonesia, until full independence was achieved in December 1949.  
 An increasing number of studies into the many confusing events during these years 
have enhanced our understanding of political development and social change during this 
period.1 But they almost exclusively attended to the political aspects of Japanese 
occupation and decolonisation. Most of these studies only provide piecemeal information 
on the material impact of the political events on the lives of ordinary people. There are 
fragmentary impressions about declining food supply and about the disastrous 
recruitment of Javanese labourers during the Japanese occupation. For the period of 
decolonisation most of the studies only hint to the economic situation as far as it 
concerned the Dutch aspirations to re-establish colonial rule.  
 Sutter (1959) covered several economic aspects of the 1940s, but left food 
production undiscussed. Kishi and Nishijima (1963) discussed some economic aspects, 
including food supply, but their discussion is often vague and confusing, which may be 
due to the sometimes awkward translations from the Japanese original. Sluimers (1985) 
tried to assess the supply of rice during the Japanese occupation, but ignored most of the 
available sources. Scott (1985) attempted to describe the food situation in Southeast Asia 
under Japanese rule, but his brief study lacks intimate knowledge of the actual situation in 
Indonesia.2 Cribb (1986a) contributed a revealing article about the competency dispute in 
Jakarta between the colonial and the Republican municipal administration, in which food 
supply was an important issue. 
 Kurasawa’s doctoral thesis is the most elaborated study of economic aspects in Java 
during the Japanese occupation. Amongst others, it contains two chapters on agricultural 
changes and on the Japanese rice delivery system.3 Her description of the rice delivery 
system and its consequences is very useful, but it does not reveal much about the actual 
changes in general food supply in Java. Kurasawa implicitly assumes that the Japanese 
                     
1.  See for political changes during the Japanese occupation e.g.: Anderson (1972); Aziz 
(1955); Kanahele (1967). Political complications during decolonisation have been discussed by 
e.g.: De Jong (1988); Kahin (1952); McMahon (1981); Oey (1981); Yong (1982). Social changes 
from a local perspective are described by e.g.: Cribb (1990a,b); Kahin (1985); Kartodirdjo (1982); 
Reid (1986). 
2.  And other countries in the region for that matter such as Malaya and the Philippines: Lee 
(1981); Kratoska (1988); Kerkvliet (1985) and Danquah (1990). 
3.  Kurasawa (1988) pp.31-180. Parts of the thesis were published elsewhere. Kurasawa (1981) 
is a summary of the two chapters in Japanese. Kurasawa (1983) described the contribution of the 
Japanese rice procurements in Indramayu to anti-Japanese uprisings.  
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authorities had no choice but to implement ‘controls on production’, because, ‘[...] owing 
to the suspension of foreign trade and the imposition of large-scale Japanese military 
demands, there was a radical change in the supply-demand balance of materials and 
commodities, and the government had to induce villagers to adjust their production 
system [...]’ (p.11, compare p.108). This study will explain that the food requirements of 
the Japanese military were relatively modest. Moreover, there was no overall food 
shortage in Java in 1942, nor was the disruption of foreign trade so important for the 
Javanese food economy that public intervention was required. It is therefore not at all 
self-evident that the Japanese authorities had no choice but to implement a very rigorous 
rice delivery and distribution system in 1943. 
 This paper explores the available evidence on the development of a crucial sector in 
the Indonesian economy: food production. In late colonial Indonesia both production and 
employment in agriculture still dominated the economy. Despite considerable economic 
growth during the first three decades of the 20th century, the standard of living in 
Indonesia was still relatively low. (Van der Eng, 1992a) Food consumption is a good 
indicator of changes in the standard of living during early phases of economic 
development. (Van der Eng, 1993) The stage of economic development in late colonial 
Indonesia implies that changes in food supply reveal to a large extent how the country 
fared economically. Moreover, the attempts to control food supply, in particular rice, help 
to analyse the political position which each of the three political forces in Indonesia 
(Dutch, Japanese, Indonesian) occupied during the years 1940-1950.  
 The next chapter will argue that the food economy of Indonesia as a whole became 
increasingly integrated during the 1930s. After 1942 Java became economically separated 
from the rest of the country. There are indications that food supply in some areas of the 
rest of Indonesia deteriorated considerably, especially in areas where workers depended 
previously of wage labour at plantations and mines. But on the whole it seems that there 
was enough land available in the rest of Indonesia to sustain sections of the population 
which depended hitherto on imported food. The balance between population and food 
supply was much more delicate in densely populated Java. The paper therefore 
concentrates on the situation in Java.  
 It has to be acknowledged beforehand that the available quantitative and qualitative 
information is patchy. It is therefore crucial that the paper not only discussed the statis-
tical evidence, but also the reasons which may explain the changes in food supply. The 
study is based on rather fragmented impressions from available published sources, 
supplemented with information from a preliminary exploration of archival sources. It 
does not pretend to be complete. Next to a precursory establishment of the main trends in 
food supply, it seeks to determine the main topics in this field and the blank spots which 
may be cleared with further research. 
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2. Pre-War Food Production and Supply 
 
Before 1930 Indonesia had imported about 10% of it domestic supply of rice. Rice 
imported into Java was sufficient to supply 2.3 million people a ration of 350 grams per 
day, which equals the entire urban population. Imports into the rest of Indonesia sufficed 
to feed 3 million people with the same ration. This figure approaches the total number of 
workers on plantations and mines, plus the rubber and copra producing smallholders and 
their families, who depended on imported rice. 
 The international economic slump of the early 1930s caused a decline in the 
international demand for commodities. This decline was reflected in a general drop of 
commodity prices in the international market. The international price of rice fell much 
faster than that of other commodities, because farmers in Burma, Thailand and Indochina 
increased their production in order to keep their cash income at level. Indonesia’s foreign 
trade in food products was not subjected to any regulations. The price of rice in Indonesia 
therefore followed the international price.  
 Most rice producers in Java had found it difficult to compete with rice farmers in 
mainland Southeast Asia. Now the rapid fall of domestic food prices and of the barter 
terms of trade of food discouraged them even further to produce a marketable surplus. At 
the same time Indonesia experienced a decline in foreign exchange earnings due to the 
decreasing exports of traditional export crops, especially sugar. Hence, Indonesia was 
less able to pay for its food imports, especially rice. The Dutch government declined to 
devalue the Dutch guilder against the gold standard. One of the consequences was that 
the cash income of those in Indonesia who depended on imported rice decreased to such 
an extent that many people faced difficulties in purchasing rice, despite the enormous fall 
in the price of rice.   
 In March 1933 the colonial government issued the Rice Import Ordinance 
(Rijstinvoerordonnantie) to prevent negative effects for the population.4 The ordinance 
was meant to restrict the import of rice, in order to stabilise the domestic rice prices at an 
economically viable levels, and to achieve an equitable distribution of rice in the archi-
pelago. A special Rice Import Commission monitored the development of rice prices and 
established so-called ‘target’ prices. These targets were minimum prices, which had to be 
maintained through a system of licences for rice imports. If the rice price in an area fell 
too quickly, the commission would restrict the import licenses for the area concerned.  
 In July 1933 the government went a step further. It imposed an extra variable tax on 
rice imports.5 The revenue was used to subsidise shipments of rice from Java to the rest 
of Indonesia. In order to prevent a rapid price increase in the rice deficient areas in the 
islands outside Java, the colonial government started to defend a ceiling price in these 
areas with the sale of restricted quantities of imported rice. At the same time it 
encouraged the rice deficient areas to purchase rice from the rice surplus areas in the 
archipelago, instead of importing it from abroad. For this purpose it employed a system 
                     
4.  Staatsblad (1933) No.116 and 299-300. 
5.  Staatsblad (1933) No.299 and 300, (1934) No.85. 
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of subsidies on the freight rates for food products of the State Railways 
(Staatsspoorwegen) and the inter-island shipping company KPM (Koninklijke Paketvaart 
Maatschappij).  
 Imported rice increasingly replaced domestic rice. Until July 1933 the price of 
imported rice on rural markets in Java had been about 20% lower than the cheapest kind 
of domestic rice. But after 1933 the domestic food prices gradually stabilised and the 
difference between the prices of imported and domestic rice gradually declined. This 
decrease made domestic rice a viable alternative for consumers.  
 Although a gradual economic recovery started in 1934, the government extended its 
involvement in domestic food production. The import of soybeans and soybean products, 
such as soy sauce, were subjected to the same restrictions as for rice, in an attempt to 
protect domestic production of soybeans. Some measures were taken to back up the price 
of maize and in 1938 the Cassava Board (Cassave Centrale) was established started to 
improve the quality of cassava and cassava products.  
 During the 1930s the measures in support of food production, such as improvement 
of irrigation and agricultural extension, were expanded.6 The area of technically irrigated 
land in Java increased from 0.8 million ha in 1928 to 1.2 million ha in 1938. The 
cropping ratio of irrigated land increased subsequently from 125% to 145%, which 
implied that by 1938 45% of the land yielded two crops per year. It was expected at the 
time that expansion of the activities of both the Irrigation Service (Irrigatiedienst) and the 
Agricultural Extension Service (Landbouwvoorlichtingsdienst, LVD), the extension of 
technical irrigation works to village level, the cropping ratio would increase to 175% in 
1950. The cropping ratio of upland area had increased from 74% to 87%, and was 
expected to increase to 100% in 1950.7 Until 1950 the increase of the cropping ratio was 
expected to sustain an estimated population growth of 1.5% per year, keeping per capita 
food consumption at level. After 1950 Java would have to take refuge to other techniques 
to intensify food production, such as the use of high-yielding seeds and fertiliser.  
 The increase in rice production was not due to the demise of sugar production. 
Between 1929 and 1941 the area under sugar cane decreased by 91,000 ha. Total 
irrigated area increased by 140,000 ha and the area harvested with irrigated rice by 
723,000 ha. Even if it is assumed that the area under cane could produce three rice crops 
against one cane crop, it is clear that the fall of cane area contributed at best 38% to the 
increase of harvested area. On the supply side the main reasons for the expanding rice 
production were the substantial increase in the cropping ratio due to public investment in 
irrigation works, and the slight increase in average rice yield per hectare. A major reason 
on the demand side was the increasing profitability of rice production due to the 
protection from foreign competition. Indonesian rice imports fell from an average of 
596,000 tons in the years 1926-1930 to 147,000 tons in 1937. For Java they decreased 
from 225,000 tons to a mere 9,000 tons in 1937.  
                     
6.  ‘Voedselproblemen’ (1940, pp.645-647 and 665-672) discusses these policies in detail. 
7.  This figure was obtained by dividing the area planted with one-year crops by the total 
upland area, which excluded areas with perennial crops. The actual ratio including perennial crops 
may have been about 100%.  
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In the Face of War 
 
When the threat of war and a possible disruption of international trade became 
unavoidable, the colonial government sought additional ways of improving domestic rice 
production in order to be prepared for a situation in which rice imports would be 
obstructed. On 25 April 1939 it established a special section of the Department of 
Economic Affairs, the Food Stuffs Fund (Voedingsmiddelenfonds, VMF).8 The VMF was 
meant to aim at stabilising the price of rice at ƒ2.90 per 100 kg. for stalk paddy of the 
cereh varieties and ƒ3.25 for the bulu varieties.9 This price would guarantee producers 
and traders a fair return. Hence, in practice VMF defended a floor price for stalk paddy in 
Java by purchasing or selling rice. The system worked as follows. Rice mills were 
obliged to purchase stalk paddy at least the floor price. If they failed to sell their rice 
stocks on the free market, VMF guaranteed that it would purchase unsold stocks at the 
floor price plus a milling margin, which differed according to the quality of the rice. At 
the same time the VMF monopolised rice imports and took control in September 1939 
over shipments of rice between the islands with a system of licenses.  
 A second task of VMF was to accumulate an emergency buffer stock of rice, 
sufficient to bridge over six months in the areas depending on rice imports. A stock of 
rice for three months would be kept in these areas; a stock of unmilled rice for another 
three months would be kept in the harbour towns on the North coast of Java. Six months 
was expected to be the maximum time which could pass until the next harvest, if the 
outbreak of the war would coincide with the planting season and the international rice 
trade would be disrupted. With the accumulated stock of rice, VMF had to prevent 
substantial price fluctuations in traditionally rice deficient areas in Central and East Java 
(Pemalang, Grobongan and Bojonegoro) during the dry season. VMF did not hesitate to 
sell at a loss in these areas, where the purchasing power was insufficient to pay the 
commercial bottom price of rice, and where cassava was the only alternative for 
consumers.10 For the domestic purchase of rice the VMF obtained credits from private 
banks in Indonesia. For its foreign purchase credits came from the central bank, the 
Javasche Bank. In principle VMF thus became a very important and powerful tool of the 
colonial government in its endeavour to guarantee an equal distribution and fair prices of 
rice in the archipelago through procurement and injection. It was effective, although it 
only purchased 81,500 tons of stalk paddy and 95,000 tons of brown rice, together about 
3% of the production in Java, in 1939.11 The cost of controlling the rice market was not 
very high, because VMF only purchased excess rice and left the main part of rice 
marketing to private enterprise. 
 In the late 1930s the profitability of rice milling and marketing in Indonesia had 
increased. Previously, millers and traders had to face up to the risk caused by 
                     
8.  Staatsblad (1939) No.56. 
9.  Bennett and Wickezer (1941) p.186.  
10.  ‘Voedingsproblemen’ (1940) p.653. 
11.  ‘Netherlands Indies Food Supply Fund’ (1939/40) p.124.  
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unpredictable seasonal price changes, and the impact of imported cheap rice. But due to 
government interference, the rice prices were stabilised throughout the year. The risk 
declined and the rice trade shifted from imported rice to domestic rice. Consequently, the 
number of rice mills in Java increased from 261 in 1930 to 474 in 1939. Due to the 
instalment of modern electrical equipment, the milling capacity increased almost four 
times. Most mills were concentrated in a few areas, especially the residencies of Jember 
(especially in Banyuwangi), Indramayu and Karawang. In these areas a bitter competition 
for the rice surplus emerged, because the surplus was insufficient to serve all mills. Only 
55% of the total milling capacity was actually used in 1939.12 At that time the mills 
processed nearly 25% of the produced paddy in Java, which is about 90% of the 
marketed production. Most of the milled rice was sold to estates and factories in Java and 
the rest of Indonesia for distribution among their labourers. The rest was used for 
distribution to rice deficient areas for price stabilisation. 
 In June 1939 the colonial government started to seek a way to counter the over-
capacity in rice milling, and the negative consequences of increasing competition 
between the mills. It appeared that more farmers sold their crops before the harvest to the 
mills, which contracted teams of harvesters. Farmers avoided the cost of harvesting. The 
net cash revenues of farmers indeed increased, but often at the expense of many of the 
local people who used to earn a wage in kind during the rice harvest. Moreover, it 
happened that farmers were tempted to sell their entire crop, but were forced to consume 
the cheaper, but less nutritious cassava products during the dry season. Or they had to buy 
milled rice for which they had to enter loans. It also appeared that due to the increasing 
consumption of polished rice beriberi emerged again, because polished rice contained 
fewer nutrients than pounded brown rice. Lastly, the advance of the rice mills meant a 
threat to the income of hand-pounders.  
 An additional reason for the government to tighten its grip on the domestic rice 
marketing system was the outbreak of World War II late in 1939. During World War I 
the country had experienced how vulnerable especially the rice deficient areas outside 
Java were, when trade relations with the rice exporting areas of Southeast Asia were 
disrupted. Anticipation on the impact of the war meant that the colonial government 
aimed at furthering rice self-sufficiency in Indonesia. In April 1940 the government 
issued the Rice Mills Ordinance (Bedrijfsreglementeringsverordening Rijstpellerijen). 
The ordinance licensed the operation and establishment of rice mills with a capacity of 
more than 2 hp in those parts of the archipelago where an over-capacity in rice milling 
threatened to occur: Java, Lampung and parts of Palembang and Southeast Kalimantan. 
At the same time the government compelled rice millers to organise themselves in 
associations of rice mills. These associations were to be united nationally in the 
Federation of Associations of Rice Mills (Nederlandsch-Indische Federatie van Rijst-
pellerijbonden, NIFR), which was a private organisation. The NIRF centralised the sales 
of rice for its members. It agreed to selling rice at a minimum price, on the condition that 
VMF would buy the unsold rice surplus. 
 Java had become self-sufficient in rice in 1936. This did not mean that all 
                     
12.  Moeljono (1971) p.6. 
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residencies in Java were self-sufficient. About 900,000 tons of milled rice were 
transported by train, 300,000 tons by truck and 150,000 tons by boat, and distributed in 
Java in order to guarantee a sufficient supply of rice everywhere.13 The remainder was 
shipped to the rest of the country. In 1940 the import surpluses of Sumatra had been 
128,000 tons, of Riau, Bangka and Belitung together 71,000 tons and of Kalimantan 
63,000 tons. These quantities were shipped from surplus areas in Java, Lampung, Aceh, 
South Sulawesi, Sumbawa, Bali and Lombok, or imported.  
 In 1941 the number of rice mills in Java continued to increase to 646, which milled 
1,150,000 tons of rice, or 25% of rice production.14 The now apparent Japanese menace 
and the fact that World War II disrupted shipping facilities, made self-sufficiency in food 
a major goal in the economic policy of the colonial government. Consequently, the 
government took complete control over the rice milling business. It furthered the 
establishment in April 1941 of Rice Marketing Boards (Rijstverkoop Centrales, RVCs) in 
each of the three provinces in Java. These RVCs came under the umbrella of the NIFR. 
Only rice mills which joined the RVCs were allowed to purchase paddy against prices 
which were guaranteed by the VMF. In turn, only the RVCs were allowed to transport 
and trade rice.  
 Although the market for home-pounded rice remained free of government control, it 
is possible to assume that by 1941 the government indirectly controlled about 90% of the 
domestic rice trade. Moreover, it now had a network of institutions with which it could 
monitor the food situation throughout the country. The local civil administrators and the 
agricultural extension officials supplied monthly reports on the food situation at district 
level. In case of crop failures, relief measures could be organised immediately. 
Quantitative information on prices and production was assembled by the Central Bureau 
of Statistics in monthly reports.  
 This elaborate system was not only necessitated by the threat of war. It also served 
to allay concern about popular prosperity in Java, where arable land had run out in the 
1920s and the balance between the expansion of food production and population growth 
could only be maintained through the adoption of land-replacing production techniques. 
Pending the disturbed international commodity markets, a satisfactory level of food 
consumption could only be guaranteed through judicious government intervention on the 
supply side of the rice economy.  
 In December 1941 there was a substantial stock of about 230,000 tons of rice under 
control of VMF. Next to that, the colonial government had accepted in September 1939 
the Compulsory Cultivation Ordinance (Teeltdwang Ordonnantie), which enabled the 
regional civil servants and the LVD officials to compel anyone, especially estates to grow 
food crops.15 This ordinance was only valid in the residencies in the Other Islands which 
depended on rice imports and in Aceh and Tapanuli, which both were to help alleviate 
the rice shortage in North Sumatra. In addition, the organisations of estate owners in 
Sumatra had decided to make 41,500 ha available for dry-land rice cultivation by 
                     
13.  ‘Economische Toestand’ (1947) p.123. 
14.  Economic Review of Indonesia (1949) p.27. 
15.  Staatsblad (1939) No.538. 
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indigenous farmers and estate labourers. They also established an ‘iron stock’ of rice for 
three months in anticipation of disruptions in international food trade in a war situation. 
There were about 350,000 labourers in North Sumatra. Including their families, some one 
million people, who each consumed on average about 350 grams of rice per day. Hence, 
the private stock on the estates could have been about 140,000 tons.  
 In 1941 Indonesia as a whole could afford a small export surplus of rice and was 
thus self-sufficient in rice, a situation which had not occurred since the years 1885-1887. 
When the colonial government surrendered to the Japanese army in 1942, the food 
situation in the entire country was satisfactory. Even in Java, where the balance between 
food production and population growth was precarious, average food supply was higher 
than average requirements. There certainly was malnutrition in Indonesia among the poor 
and in particular regions. But that was not due to a lack of supplies, but to a combination 
of the lack of income opportunities to purchase food, and transport impediments in 
remote regions. 
 
 
3. Food Production and Supply during the Japanese Occupation, 
1942-1945 
 
An assessment of the food policy and the food situation during the Japanese occupation 
should take account of the fact that after the occupation of the country the Japanese 
authorities divided Indonesia into three executive sections. After a while these sections 
were compelled to become economically self-sufficient. Java became ruled by the 
Military Authority of the 16th Army (Gunseibu). Sumatra formed an administrative unit 
with Malaya and became ruled from Singapore, the headquarters of the 25th Army. In 
April 1943 Sumatra became independent from Singapore, and was henceforth governed 
from Bukittinggi. Kalimantan, Sulawesi and the rest of East Indonesia became part of the 
so-called Naval Districts. The naval government (Minseibu) was under direct supervision 
of the Naval Department in Tokyo. Apart from the establishment of three provinces in 
East Indonesia, there were no striking formal changes in the administrative structure of 
government, neither at the central level, nor at lower levels. In the main the difference 
was characterised by a change of names of the government institutions, which were 
gradually taken over from the Dutch by Japanese superiors and Indonesian subordinates. 
 During the siege of Java most rice mills were put out of action by Dutch destruction 
teams. But the main part of the mills was able to resume milling in June 1942, because 
there were sufficient spare parts available in Java. In April 1942 the Japanese military 
government recognised the importance of the colonial system of price control. The VMF 
was continued under the name Nanyō Kohatsu Kaisha, the RVCs under the name 
Beikoku Tosei Kai (BKTs). The military government also established the Corporation of 
Rice Wholesalers (Beikoku Sho Dogyo Kumiai, BSDK) to which all milled rice had to be 
sold. The BSDK then took care of the distribution of rice to retailers in the cities.  
 On 12 August 1942 the military government established the Office for Food Supply 
(Syokuryō Kanri Zimusho, SKZ) at the Department of Economic Affairs. The SKZ took 
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over the functions of the colonial VMF and handled all food matters. With the 
establishment of the SKZ some changes were introduced into the system. The BKTs and 
the NIFR were centralised into the Federation of Unions of Rice Mills (Beisho Renkokai, 
BR) with three main regional sections. Through the BR the Gunseibu took almost 
complete direct control over the purchase of rice. It financed all purchases by the mills, 
which henceforth acted as government agents. Only the mills were allowed to transport 
paddy. In return for this monopoly, they were obliged to deliver their milled rice to the 
BSDK, which was renamed Corporation of Rice Traders (Beikoku Orosisyo Kumiai, 
BOK). In practice BOK took care of the distribution of rice to:  
 
• the Japanese army, the government officials and for export; 
• Indonesian civil servants;  
• romushas, heihos and other auxiliary Indonesian groups;  
• the camps where Western civilians and POWs were kept detained;  
• the urban centres.  
 
 SKZ was later reorganised several times, due to the fact that rice production was 
lower than the Japanese authorities had expected. In September 1943 SKZ became part 
of the Syndicate for Important Commodities (Zyunyō Bushi Koodan, ZBK), which had 
two sections: one for food commodities and one for strategic commodities like metals and 
textiles. In April 1944 the section for food products was separated from ZBK to become 
the Office for Food Supply (Syokuryō Kanri Kyoku) at the Department of Economic 
Affairs. BR also changed its name frequently. When SKZ became part of ZBK in 
September 1943, BR became Federation of Unions of Rice Mills (Seimaigyō Kumiai 
Renkokai). In April 1944 it became the Federation of Unions of Rice Producers (Tosei 
Kanri Kumiai Renkokai). For convenience this study will use the abbreviations SKZ, 
BOK and BR only. 
 
The Japanese Rice Purchase System 
 
During 1942 and 1943 there was no reason for concern about the food situation, because 
the harvests were good and the stocks substantial. Soon after the Dutch surrender the 
Japanese army was able to purchase enough paddy itself. For milling it sequestrated a few 
rice mills. But gradually it became more difficult for the Japanese army quartermasters to 
buy paddy. Until September 1942 they had intended to purchase paddy for 5,000 tons of 
rice, but they only succeeded in buying paddy for 750 tons of rice. For that reason SKZ 
was ordered to take care of the supply of rice to the army. This meant that SKZ obliged 
rice mills to purchase paddy in its name, to mill it and sell it for a fixed price to SKZ.16 
 In 1942 the purchase of rice was no major problem for the military government in 
Java. For the whole of Java the unofficial purchase target was 50,000 tons of rice, but 
there was no real urge to realise this target, because the production of rice was sufficient 
throughout the year. But gradually SKZ experienced difficulties. Partly because it had to 
                     
16.  Tan (1946). 
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get hold of increasing amounts of rice for distribution to the five groups mentioned 
above. Partly because the real purchase price of paddy declined and became unattractive 
for farmers. Especially after the dry season of 1942 it became more difficult for the rice 
mills to purchase stalk paddy, which they would then sell to SKZ for a fixed price. From 
April 1943 onward, SKZ started to enforce a more systematic purchase policy. The 
shipment and trade of staple crops between all residencies was forbidden, except on order 
of SKZ. The Japanese police and the keibodan (Indonesian auxiliary police force) 
received orders for strict control on all transports. This control had to enable SKZ to 
carry out a more rigorous purchase and distribution system.  
 In practice there was no uniform purchase and distribution policy, but its basis was 
the same throughout Java and can be summarised as follows, see Figure 1.17 Given the 
demand for rice by the Japanese army and the military government, SKZ determined how 
much rice each residency had to surrender, on the basis of the estimated requirements and 
the expected production in the residencies. At the bottom of the scheme farmers delivered 
their paddy at fixed prices to the compulsory local cooperative (kumiai).18 The kumiai 
supplied the paddy to the rice mills, from where the milled rice entered the distribution 
system. Farmers were not allowed to stock a surplus of paddy. They were obliged to sell 
surpluses to the rice mills, and therefore put it under the control of SKZ. Private rice trade 
was forbidden and in principle all residencies were expected to become self-sufficient. If 
rice shortages occurred in a residency, the authorities had to apply for additional supplies 
from SKZ. 
 The authorities in the residencies used different methods of assessing the quota at 
lower levels. Sometimes the quota were fixed according to the land tax assessments. In 
Madiun every hectare of irrigated land was expected to yield 0.5 to 0.6 ton of which 0.1 
ton had to be handed over. But this was insufficient to fulfil the quotum, which meant that 
the local officials (pangreh praja) forced farmers, whose land yielded only 0.1 to 0.2 tons 
per hectare, to hand over an equal amount. These farmers were left with hardly any rice.19 
In Kediri farmers operating land up to 2 ha were assessed 20%, between 2 and 5 ha 50% 
and over 5 ha 70% of their production. In 1945 the quota for Bogor were for farmers 
operating up to 1 ha 40%, between 1 and 3 ha 50%, between 3 and 5 ha 60% and over 5 
ha 75%. In Semarang the purchase of paddy was fixed according to the estimated yields 
per sub-district. Each sub-district was expected to surrender a quantity of rice, according 
to its size. This procedure did not take account of the fact that landowners did not always 
live in the sub-district where their fields were. They transported their rice to the sub-
                     
17.  ‘Landbouwvoorlichting’ (1946) pp.187-188; Kurasawa (1983) pp.55 and 118-137; 
Anderson (1966) p.87. A copy of the original 1945 report by O. Iskandardinata about local rice 
purchase is held at IA-RIOD, No.036626-036655. 
18.  Kurasawa (1988, pp.298-316) gives an elaborate discussion of these organisations, which 
were cooperatives only in name. In reality they were ‘a part of a government bureau under 
supervision of the pangreh praja’, similar to the present day Koperasi Unit Desa in Indonesia. 
(p.304)  
19.  IA-RIOD, No.020114. 
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district where they lived, whereas the sub-district where their fields were had to surrender 
according to the average yield and size, regardless of transported crops.20 In Soreang (a 
sub-district near Bandung) it was determined that for each guilder of land tax a farmer 
had to surrender 0.6 to 0.8 tons of paddy.21 In Ciparai (another sub-district near Bandung) 
the amount was simply put at a fixed amount per land holding.  
 
 
Figure 1: Rice Purchase and Supply System during the Japanese Occupation 
 
               
  
   
 The system left a lot of opportunities for abuse.22 Misuse could start with the 
                     
20.  IA-RIOD, No.020115. 
21.  IA-RIOD, No.036620. 
22.  Anderson (1966) pp.95-99; Lucas (1991) pp.46-49. Hatta (1971) pp.55-58, 65-66, 83, 101-
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assessment of quota. In order to ensure that the lower administrative layers would feel the 
pressure and do there utmost to convince the lower levels, and ultimately the farmers, to 
surrender paddy, the quota were increased along the way down to the village level. In part 
this was done in order to be sure that at least part of the imposed quota, and therefore a 
major part of the original quota would be delivered. Another reason is the development of 
the black market for rice. The black market price of rice increased rapidly. Hence, more 
and more members of the pangreh praja started to abuse their feudal esteem by 
increasing the quota as a way of getting hold of rice supplies, with which they 
supplemented their declining real official incomes.  
 VMF had paid locally different purchase prices. But SKZ paid fixed prices to the 
mills for its purchases. The maximum fixed price per 100 kg of stalk paddy was ƒ3.25 
(cereh) and ƒ3.50 (bulu). In October 1943 the prices were raised to ƒ4.00 and ƒ4.50 
respectively. In October 1944 the price was raised to ƒ10.00, regardless of the variety, 
and in May 1945 to ƒ15.00.23 But these were not the prices which farmers obtained from 
the mills via the kumiai. For several reasons farmers received only about 45% of this 
price: 
 
• The prices quoted above were prices which the mills received, which meant that the 
purchase prices of the mills were lower in order to include a milling margin. This 
milling margin was not fixed. 
• Mill owners were allowed to apply subjective deductions for moistness or low quality. 
• Mill owners cheated farmers by tampering with the weights.  
• The kumiai were controlled by the local officials. Cooperation between the mill 
owners and the underpaid and often corrupt local officials made that the mills could 
establish a milling margin, or a deduction for poor quality at will, and could get away 
with cheating. 
• There were several possibilities for the kumiai officials to cheat farmers. For instance, 
in assessing the actual quantity of delivered paddy. They also deduced several items 
from the prices which they were supposed to pay to farmers. At first land tax was 
deducted from the purchase price. Hence, farmers regarded the quota they delivered to 
the kumiai as a kind of compulsory tax, which they accepted reluctantly.24 In other 
cases the kumiai deducted overhead costs and membership fees at will.   
• Farmers were officially allowed to keep 20% of the production after the harvest. The 
                                                  
104. 
23.  Tan (1946). 
24.  The Japanese authorities insisted that the land tax itself would be paid in July, immediately 
after the main harvest. In the colonial days the tax had to be paid before the end of the year. This 
was done in order not to press farmers to sell their rice in order to obtain cash at the time of the year 
when the prices were low. The Japanese order therefore disadvantaged farmers. (IA-RIOD, 
No.060842, p.21)  
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rest had to be stored at warehouses controlled by the kumiai or had to be sold to the 
rice mills via the kumiai. After delivery the paddy was stored at the kumiai, until the 
rice mill owners came to collect it. During that period the farmer remained responsible 
for the paddy in storage. If anything was missing at the time when the mill owner came 
to collect it, the farmer was obliged to supplement the quota. 
 
 Moreover, the real value of the purchase prices declined rapidly. Soon after March 
1942 the Japanese authorities had issued price regulations, which fixed all prices at the 
level of 1 January 1942. The prices were revised during the occupation, but since late 
1943, when the Japanese started to pay for the many defence projects through monetary 
financing, price control slipped out of their hands. There are suggestions that price 
controls were only enforced at market places, when Japanese quartermasters were doing 
their shopping, so that they could pay the low official prices for their purchases.25  
 The unofficial prices varied very much from throughout Java, despite the 
distribution system, because transport impediments and controls made it increasingly 
difficult for the black market to allocate rice supplies from surplus to deficit areas.26 In 
rough terms the black market retail prices in the cities rose during 1943 to two to three 
times the rural black market value. Hence, black market trade was very profitable. Private 
traders offered much higher prices for paddy or home-pounded rice than the farmers 
received via the kumiai. The rural prices of home-pounded rice rose from ƒ6.50 per 100 
kg in 1942 to ƒ9.00 in 1943, ƒ27.50 in 1944 and ƒ200.- in 1945.27 Assuming that farmers 
actually received 45% of the purchase prices paid by the BOK, the rural black market 
prices were therefore 2 to 15 times higher than what farmers received for officially 
surrendered paddy.  
 The systems of price control and control over the rice market were based on the 
Dutch colonial regulations, but the essential differences were that they were direct rather 
than indirect, rigorous rather than flexible. The gap between official and unofficial prices 
increased enormously and induced many local officials to corrupt themselves, possibly 
with the approval or active cooperation of corrupt Japanese officials.28 In the cities rice 
fetched even higher prices than in the rural areas. Given these price differentials it is very 
likely that traders hoarded rice for speculation and for smuggling across the residency 
borders to the rice deficient areas.  
 Malversation was also possible at the receiving end, at the various levels of rice 
distribution. BOK was officially allowed to increase the prices for which it sold the rice 
                     
25.  IA-RIOD, No.014614-014625. 
26.  Retail prices per litre (0.79 kg.) in December 1944: Jakarta and Bogor ƒ3.25; Ciamis ƒ2.40; 
Semarang ƒ1.50; Pati ƒ2.70; Bojonegoro ƒ1.20; Kediri ƒ1.50. (Anderson (1966) p.92). During that 
month the official distribution price was raised from 8 cents to 10 cents per litre. 
27.  ‘Economische Toestand’ (1947) p.126. 
28.  Reid (1986) p.20. 
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to its members with a transport margin and the wanted profit. In fact, the transport margin 
did not matter to BOK, because the profit margin would be set at will. In other words, the 
transport margin was open to bargaining. Likewise, BOK members were allowed to 
increase their selling price with a fluctuating transport margin. Like the purchase system, 
the distribution system was also controlled down to the neighbourhood shops (warung).  
 Although the wholesalers could manipulate their margins, the warungs were 
obliged to sell rice at a fixed price of 12 cents per litre. Their profit margin was only 60 to 
80 cents per 100 kg.29 Each shop could at most sell 2 tons of rice per month, which 
rendered a revenue of ƒ12.- to ƒ16.-, from which the transport costs to the shop still had 
to be deducted. Hence, retailing rice according to the official guidelines was not very 
profitable.30 Shopkeepers only continued to sell rice as a service to their customers.  
 This indicates that distributed rice was available in urban areas at affordable prices 
as far as supply through the distribution system actually worked. It is unclear to what 
extent urban supplies of distributed rice were maintained during the Japanese occupation. 
There appear to have been many deficiencies in the system, due to which distributed 
quota were often below the targets. With the increasing deficiencies in the transport 
system, an increasing number of things gradually started to go wrong in the system, 
before the rice reached the shops. Thefts, rotting of rice, spillage and ‘losses’ in general 
seem to have increased. Especially the last category may explain a large part of the 
deficiencies of the system. 
 
 
Table 1: Forced Deliveries of Stalk Paddy in Central Java, 1942-1946 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
 Fixed Quota Purchased Quota as % Purchase as  
 ———(thousand tons)——— of Harvest % of Harvest 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
1942/43a - 29b - 1% 
1943/44 330 205 12% 8% 
1944/45 327 269 15% 12% 
1945/46 512 234c 23% 10% 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
a. In this period purchase concerned free sales. 
b. Excluding Yogyakarta, where only a few rice mills existed. 
a. April-September 1945. 
Note: Central Java includes Surakarta and Yogyakarta. 
Source: ‘Economische Toestand’ (1947) p.124 
 
 
                     
29.  IA-RIOD, No.020117. 
30.  Compare Frederick (1990) p.102. 
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 Although BOK announced that for the whole of Java the requested amount of rice 
was about 20% of the surplus production, the stratified method of getting hold of the rice 
increased the average quota in the wet season harvest of 1945 to between 30% and 50%. 
But the pressure of the quota differed locally and increased in due time. The most 
complete data are available for Central Java and shown in Table 1. The table indicates 
how the quota and the actually purchased quantities differed from one another, and how 
the required amount increased during the Japanese occupation. However, there are 
fragmented indications that the actually imposed quota were significantly higher than the 
overall 20%. In the three regencies of Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang they were 50% of 
production in many areas.31 In Jepara it was 25% to 33% of production.32 In Wonogiri 
(Surakarta) at least a third of production.33 In Banten the overall assessment was 67%, in 
Banyumas 50%.34 The discrepancies between the overall figures and these data most 
likely reflect the cumulative effect of the ‘mark-ups’ applied by indigenous officials. 
 An inspection tour of Soebardjo, an Indonesian adviser to the Japanese military 
government, in January 1944 indicated that the imposition of quota has been at random, 
regardless of the productive capacity of certain areas.35 The pressure on the farmers was 
the cause of several uprisings against the Indonesian civil servants and the Japanese 
authorities in Indramayu (September 1944), and after the Japanese surrender in the Tiga 
Daerah of Pekalongan.36 In spite of the obviously declining production and the popular 
discontent, the Japanese authorities did not decrease the quota, as Table 1 indicates for 
Central Java. But the amount of rice on which they could lay their hands declined.  
 The mills only operated for the Japanese authorities. Table 2 may therefore provide 
an indication of the amounts of rice under official control. The shares of processed paddy 
in Central Java seem to differ only marginally from the shares in Table 1. If the 
information in both tables is obtained from independent sources, then we may assume 
that the figures in Table 2 are accurate. It is clear that the burden differed very much 
between the three major areas in Java. The absolute quantities are much lower than the 2 
million tons of paddy handled by rice mills in Java each year during 1937-1941. The 
average of 15-20% is also considerably lower than the 25% of the paddy harvest which 
the mills handled during 1937-1941.37 This may to some extent be the result of the 
destruction of some rice mills during the Dutch retreat in March 1942. But the main 
differences are that rice production declined by 35% between 1942 and 1945, and that 
                     
31.  Lucas (1991) pp.31-34. 
32.  Hüsken (1988) p.104. 
33.  Kartodirdjo (1982) p.42. 
34.  Anderson (1966) pp.88, 89 and 104. 
35.  IA-RIOD, No.020113-020122; Kishi and Nishijima (1963) pp.283-286 and 324-325. 
36.  Kurasawa (1983); Lucas (1991). 
37.  Calculated form Van der Eng (1990), Changing Economy in Indonesia Vol.8: 
Manufacturing Industry (1988) p.136 and Economic Review of Inonesia (1949) p.27.  
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mills could only mill for the region where they were situated.  
 
 
Table 2: Paddy Milled by Rice Mills, 1943-1945 (tons)  
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
 —West Java— —Central Java— —East Java— ——Total—— 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
1943 639,880 (22%) 239,865 (9%) 610,801 (23%) 1,490,546 (18%) 
1944 396,020 (17%) 269,849 (13%) 678,542 (28%) 1,344,411 (20%) 
1945 219,517 (10%) 210,071 (11%) 558,150 (25%)   987,738 (15%) 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Note: Between brackets the share of total production.  
Sources: IA-RIOD, No.056514; Geoogste Uitgestrektheden (1947), production for 1945 
estimated with 1942/43 average yield per residency. 
 
 
Japanese Attempts to Increase Food Production 
 
Already in 1942 Japanese authorities seem to have been convinced that Javanese 
agriculture had enormous potential, because rice production per hectare was in general 
about half what it was in Japan. Hence, they were convinced that the introduction of rice 
production technologies from Japan could turn Java into the rice bowl for the Japanese 
forces in Southeast Asia.38 They expected for instance that some small changes in rice 
production could produce an exportable surplus of 150,000-200,000 tons in 1943.39 
 The relevance of the intention to further Javanese rice production increased with the 
increasing disruption of interregional trade and the difficulties which were encountered in 
the purchase of paddy. Japanese experts were brought to Java in 1942 in order to prepare 
the enforcement of Japanese methods of rice cultivation on Javanese farmers. They 
expected that rice production could be doubled within three years. The proposed 
measures were:40  
 
• even spreading of the rice plants in the field, by promoting planting in straight parallel 
lines, rather than planting at random; 
• propaganda for composted fertiliser from rice straw and manure; 
• introduction of fast maturing rice varieties from Taiwan; 
• experiments with these new paddy varieties and the establishment of new test plots for 
                     
38.  Rodenburg (1946) mentions a Japanese document which suggests that limiting rice 
production in Java with Japanese techniques to 1.4 million hectares would safeguard food supply 
and release the rest for the production of cash crops. 
39.  Kishi and Nishijima (1963) p.264. 
40.  Nefis Periodiek, No.1, p.28( 7 February 1946) IA-RIOD, No.056514. 
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the cultivation of these varieties; 
• import of tools and equipment from Japan, such as a rotary weeder; 
• combating pests and diseases with chemicals, especially nicotine and copper sulphate; 
• establishment of several new agricultural schools; 
• improvement of irrigation facilities.  
 
 Japanese attempts to improve indigenous agriculture on a larger scale started in 
1943. In May 1943 the authorities announced a two-year plan to increase rice production 
in Java. It would start with the 1943/44 season. In November 1943 they established the 
‘Principles for the Implementation of the Urgent Counter Measures for Increasing Rice 
Production’, which included a number of measures and the establishment of a Guidance 
Centre for Urgent Increase of Food Production as a section of the Department of 
Industry. The centre had chief-engineers in the former three provinces in Java, assistant-
engineers in each residency and technical guides and assistant guides in each district.41 In 
each district they were to see to it that the following measures were taken to increase rice 
production:42  
 
• selection and dissemination of superior varieties; 
• compulsory use of Japanese production techniques; 
• improvement of irrigation works; 
• expansion of rice fields through the conversion of estate land for food production and 
reclamation of land through drainage works; 
• instruction and training of farmers. 
 
 These were all plans. It is unclear to what extent the measures were actually carried 
out.43 There is some evidence which suggests that by 1944 an extensive new top-down 
system of agricultural extension officials was in place, which started a command-style 
introduction of these improvements.44 But judging from the available rice production 
statistics in Table A.1, it must be clear that the measures failed to achieve the desired 
results in 1944 and 1945.  
 Kurasawa (1988) has analysed the failure of the Japanese measures. Most of her 
                     
41.  Kishi and Nishijima (1963) pp.264-265. 
42.  Kishi and Nishijima (1963) p.275; Kurasawa (1988) p.36. 
43.  Kurasawa (1988, p.40) suggests: ‘The Japanese way of rice-planting was [...] finally widely 
accepted by Javanese peasants because they finally understood that it was effective in bringing 
higher productivity.’ But she does not support this statement with references or figures, and even 
mentions on p.41 several incidents of farmers protesting against the compulsory measures. 
44.  Kurasawa (1988, pp.48-60) provides an overview of all Japanese measures in the field of 
agricultural extension and education. See also: ‘Landbouwvoorlichting’ (1946) pp.177-178; 
Kartodirdjo (1982) pp.41-42.  
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explanations refer to external factors, such as climate and adverse weather conditions, 
manpower shortages, shortage of cattle for ploughing, damages by rats, deteriorating 
infrastructure and the effects of deforestation. Apart from the severe January-September 
1944 drought, these factors are insufficient to explain the fall in rice production, as will 
be explained below. Kurasawa seems to acknowledge that and appears to stress that 
Javanese farmers lacked the right ‘working spirit’, both because they became demoralised 
and because they did not understand the Japanese measures mentioned above.45  
 Both the Japanese advisers in Java in the 1940s and Kurasawa have been 
mesmerised by technological arguments when they suggested that Javanese rice 
agriculture was inefficient.46 An important argument against this bold assessment is that 
technological advance in Japanese rice agriculture had been so extraordinary since the 
Meiji restoration, because of the very high population pressure on the available arable 
land reserves. Rice yields were high in Japan because of the shortage of land. But the 
technology used in Japan to obtain those high rice yields was very labour intensive. 
Japanese farmers could continue to afford such technologies, because they were to an 
increasing extent shielded from international competition through protectionist policies. 
The domestic price of rice in Japan exceeded the international rice price, especially after 
1920. Hence, labour intensive rice production continued to be attractive for Japanese 
farmers, in spite of the high production costs. In the 1940s population pressure in Java 
was still much lower than in Japan before its ‘Green Revolution’ at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Moreover, Javanese farmers did not experience any protection from 
imports of cheap rice from mainland Southeast Asia until the 1930s. Hence, the 
opportunity cost in rice production was higher than in Japan. These are more plausible 
explanations of relatively low land productivity in rice production than the ‘lack of 
working spirit’. 
 Both Kurasawa and the Japanese authorities in Java seem to have ignored most of 
the available colonial literature on the agriculture of Java, in particular the available 
knowledge of the agricultural economy of Java. The measures mentioned above seem to 
have been almost exclusively based on the Japanese historical experience with command-
style extension of technological change in rice agriculture. These measures were hailed in 
the Japanese propaganda as major novelties. But several of them do not seem to be much 
                     
45.  Kurasawa (1988) pp.66-68 and 108. 
46.  Frederick (1990, pp.101 and 126) repeated the argument, saying that Javanese agriculture 
was ‘scandalously inefficient’. Kurasawa’s (1988, p.33) simple explanation for low land 
productivity in Javanese rice agriculture is: ‘[...] mainly because of lack of technical innovation, 
fertilisers and funds for the construction of technical irrigation, cultivation methods remained rather 
primitive in those days [1938/39] and [land] productivity was low.’ Such arguments fail to 
acknowledge that not land productivity, but labour productivity is the crucial factor in agricultural 
development. Land productivity in rice production was much lower in mainland Southeast Asia, 
although labour productivity was considerably higher than in Japan. (Van der Eng, 1992b)  
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different from the advice provided by the colonial agricultural extension service.  
 The effects of manuring seed beds, straight-line planting of seedlings, organic 
manures and rotary weeders were already propagated in Java by the LVD before World 
War II.47 But colonial agricultural extension officials were familiar with the reasons why 
farmers opposed such measures. For instance, Javanese farmers were hardly interested in 
applying organic manure on rice, because the marginal productivity of fertiliser was too 
low. Javanese farmers were certainly not ignorant of the effect of fertilisers, because they 
used on a range of other crops which had a much higher value added than rice.48   
 It seems that Japanese officials ignored the fact that the selection of superior rice 
varieties which suited the preferences of producers and consumers had its very particular 
technical problems in colonial Indonesia. It had taken until the late 1920s before a viable 
extension program had been established. The Japanese seem to have ignored this, by 
suggesting that the gap in rice yields between Java and Japan could be overcome by 
importing the very different superior Japanese and Taiwanese rice varieties. Attempts to 
spread these among the farmers failed, because these varieties produced sticky rice, rather 
than the firm rice preferred in Indonesia, and they required a lot more care and attention 
than Javanese farmers were used to giving their crops in the field.49 
 A major difference with the pre-war agricultural policies was the Japanese 
command-style procedure. Through their Indonesian ‘agricultural instructors’, the 
Japanese officials simply prescribed ploughing of land before it would be irrigated, which 
was very uncommon in Indonesia. They ordered the restriction of the number of rice 
varieties and the strict regulation of planting time. They forbade mixed cropping of more 
than two crops and made labour intensive Japanese production techniques compulsory. 
During the colonial era the decision what to plant and when had been left to the farmers. 
Planting schemes were only used during the dry season because of the scarcity of 
irrigation water. Farmers and extension officials knew that uniformity in rice varieties and 
planting time increased the vulnerability of planted area for diseases and pests.  
 There was also a remarkable difference in the extension approach between the 
Japanese and the colonial officials. The Japanese extension method simply came down to 
giving orders in stead of advice. Moreover, there were by far insufficient people with 
adequate experience to explain the measures to farmers. Hasty training of Indonesian 
extension workers at the new agricultural schools was insufficient. Extension officials 
may not have understood themselves what it was all about. There are indications that 
farmers resented the top-down command approach.50 In conclusion, the Japanese 
authorities seem to have neglected the wider technical, economic and social factors 
                     
47.  Nefis Periodiek, No.1, p.28( 7 February 1946) IA-RIOD, No.056514. 
48.  Van der Eng (1994). 
49.  ‘Landbouwvoorlichting’ (1946) p.185. 
50.  ‘Landbouwvoorlichting’ (1946) p.177. 
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involved in furthering Javanese rice production. Hence, the idea of simply transplanting 
rice production technologies from Japan to Java was doomed from the start.  
 Kurasawa fails to come to terms with the overriding explanation for the very 
different reaction of farmers in Java to the measures which had worked so well in Japan 
decades earlier. Several other crops than rice had proven that farmers are only interested 
in labour intensive production techniques if crops are profitable. But unlike in Japan, the 
Japanese rice delivery system in Java failed to guarantee farmers an adequate 
compensation for their efforts, as explained above. Real purchase prices were simply too 
low. It did not really matter that the rice delivery system was a compulsory system, that 
the quota were high, and that the system was disorganised and loaded with abuse. 
Farmers may not have cared less, as long as they would have received adequate real 
prices for their rice. 
 Another plan to increase production was through extension of the area cultivated 
with food crops by using estate land for food production. The original plan was to convert 
66,000 ha of estate area into irrigated land, which was expected to yield about between 
150,000 to 200,000 tons of rice in 1943.51 In 1943/44 and 1944/45 about 50,000 ha, or 
half the irrigated land leased by sugar factories from farmers for the production of sugar 
cane was used by the factories under Japanese management for the production of food 
crops for the Japanese armed forces. Some 21,000 ha of estate land with perennial crops 
was also used during those years for that purpose. Even if we assume that these areas 
yielded a high 2 tons of rice per hectare, it is clear that these measures were insufficient to 
compensate the massive fall in rice production between 1943 and 1945 of 860,000 tons, 
as shown in Table A.1.  
 
Further Reasons for Declining Food Production 
 
Apart from the rigorous purchase program and the statistical flaws, there are several other 
reasons which may explain the fall in food production: (1) the neglect of irrigation works 
and increasing erosion; (2) the claim by the Japanese authorities on labour; (3) the 
declining number of cattle and buffaloes available for preparing the land for cultivation; 
(4) the demise of the transport system. 
 
Deforestation 
The effects of deforestation on the hydrological situation in Java were already recognised 
as a problem in the 1920s, when it appeared that the flow of water during the dry season 
declined in several rivers. With the trees went the extensive root systems which would 
                     
51.  46,000 ha of tea estates and 20,000 ha of coffee estates. (IA-RIOD, No.056514, p.28; Kishi 
and Nishijima (1963) p.264) 15,000 ha of forest land was also on the list to be changed into sawah. 
The other way around, about 6,500 ha was planted with cotton and rameh. 
Food Supply in Java, 1940-1950 
 
  21 
hold rain water and smooth the water flow from the mountainous upland areas to the 
irrigated lowlands. During the 1930s the colonial authorities had partly solved the 
problem with the construction of large reservoirs up in the mountains, where water was 
stored and released during the East monsoon. Colonial forestry officials had started to 
refuse farmers to permits for clearing waste land, because of the erosion problem. The 
extension of arable land was practically prohibited.  
 Local Japanese authorities in Java had to deal with increasing applications by 
farmers for the cultivation of waste land. Some officials indeed handed out such permits. 
But most of them postponed a decision until there were central rules. These came 13 
March 1943 and only said that the military government had to give permission. But in 
due time the Gunseibu had to leave it up to the authorities in the residencies to decide as 
they thought best. Hence, there were no general guidelines. Due to arbitrariness and 
ignorance, the land was handed out with disregard for the hydrological consequences. 
 Erosion increased also, because large forest areas were cut for ship building, for 
charcoal production for cooking, and for fire wood for the railways. Before the war 
325,000 tons of wood had been supplied annually to the railways, which mainly used coal 
from Sumatra. But due to the disruption of coal imports, the Japanese authorities 
demanded an increase of wood production of 500,000 tons in 1942, 700,000 tons in 1943 
and 900,000 tons in 1944 and 1945. A lot of hardwood timber was used for this 
purpose.52 The pace at which teak forests were cut down was two to three times higher 
than the colonial forestry service had allowed in the pre-war years.  
 It is not known exactly how much of the forest reserves were cut. During the 
conflict between the Dutch and the Republic in the years 1945-1949, the deforestation 
continued in the area under control of the Republic, because the Republic could also not 
import coal to run the trains. This resulted in wood production of 700,000 tons in the 
years 1946 and 1947. After the first Dutch military action in July 1947 it appeared in 
West Java that 179,100 hectares, or 21% of the pre-war forest area had been cleared.53 In 
the densely populated and ecologically vulnerable province of Central Java it appeared 
later that 18,400 hectares of forest, or up to 24% of the pre-war stock of trees had been 
cleared.54 For the whole of Java it was estimated that 400,000 to 500,000 ha or about 
13% to 16% of the pre-war area had been cut. Before the war the forestry service kept the 
forest reserves at about 17% to 20% of the land surface in Java by replanting an average 
of 5,300 ha per year during 1926-1936. Practically no reforestation had taken place 
during 1942-1947.  
 There were two negative consequences of increased deforestation. Firstly, it 
                     
52.  ‘Kort Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling van de Economische Situatie in de Republiek 
Indonesia sinds Haar Oprichting’, p.7 (6 September 1947) DP, No.5240.  
53.  Economisch Weekblad (1948) p.240. 
54.  Bryant (1973) p.148. 
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increased the risk of spates during the wet season, which destroyed indigenous irrigation 
systems. Secondly, the silt content of irrigation water increased, because of the erosion of 
the deforested upland soil. Silt deposits blocked ditches and drains of irrigation systems, 
and may have diminished the capacity of water reservoirs. There is no confirmation about 
the increasing devastation caused by spates, and the available data on paddy yields are 
not reliable. The impact on average rice yields of erosion may have been marginal, 
because the pre and post-war yields of irrigated rice do not differ. But it took until 
halfway the 1950s, before the cropping ratio of irrigated fields recovered to 1940 levels. 
Hence, it is likely that silt deposits contributed to the increasing disrepair of irrigation 
works. But rather than the result of deforestation, this may well have been caused by 
labour shortages, or the disintegration of systems for the operation and maintenance of 
irrigation constructions at all organisational levels. 
 It is possible that maintenance of irrigation works was neglected during the 
Japanese occupation and during the revolution, because of the increasing shortage of 
public funds. In June 1944 the Japanese claimed to have finished the Brantas works (East 
Java). But after the war it appeared that almost all initiated projects had not been finished, 
because of the shortage of construction materials. The only major completed project was 
the Popoh irrigation work in South Kediri in July 1944.55 This project had been planned 
by Dutch engineers in the pre-war years. It drained excessive water from about 16,000 ha. 
Several smaller projects were mentioned in the press, but it is unlikely that there were any 
major additions to the area under technical irrigation. 
 
Labour Shortage 
In June 1942 the Japanese authorities started to attract Indonesian workers, who were 
needed in the coal mines of Sumatra, the nickel mines of Sulawesi, the tropical hardwood 
forests in Sulawesi and Kalimantan, and for the construction of air strips in Irian Jaya, the 
erection of defence works all over the archipelago, or for the construction of the Burma 
railway in Thailand and the Pakanbaru railway in Sumatra. The Japanese authorities 
concealed that this was ordinary unskilled labour, by appealing to the patriotic sense of 
the labourers and by calling them labour soldiers, or economic warriors (romushas).56  
 At first workers applied voluntarily, attracted by the promised wages. But rumours 
about maltreatment of the workers on the projects and the fact that wages did not reach 
the women and children at home, caused a lower turnout that the Japanese expected. 
From July 1943 onward, all unemployed Indonesians between 18 and 25 year were 
compelled to become romushas. In October 1943 a special ‘Labour Bureau’ was 
                     
55.  Nefis Periodiek, No.1, p.28 (7 February 1946) IA-RIOD, No.056514; Kurasawa (1988) 
p.43-45. 
56.  Kurasawa (1988, pp.181-174) provides an extensive discussion. 
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established for conscripting Indonesians.57 When the supply of labour was not according 
to the Japanese needs, the bureau received far-reaching powers in October 1944. It 
established so-called ‘Labour Training Centres’. In practice these centres were 
concentration camps for unemployed Indonesians, who were rounded up at random at 
gun point. The Labour Bureau could also impose fixed quota of romushas on the local 
Indonesian civil servants, who had to see to it that the quota were fulfilled. The 
imposition of the quota was, like the rice quota, largely at random. In 1943 more than 2 
million Indonesians were working for the Japanese authorities, of which 1.5 million as 
romushas. Half of the romushas were only temporary workers.58 All together about 
300,000 people were sent to work outside Java, of whom only 76,500 returned.59  
 In the early 1940s total employment in Java was around 19 million people, of which 
about 14 million in agriculture. Assuming that the temporary romushas returned home for 
the main agricultural season, it appears that the depletion of the agricultural labour force 
by full-time romushas was about 5%. Employment opportunities outside agriculture must 
have deteriorated, which means that former non-agricultural workers may have been 
looking for income opportunities in agriculture. It is therefore difficult to see that the 
recruitment of romushas really caused a labour shortage in the rural areas.  
 
Shortage of Cattle 
The total stock of cattle in Java declined from 5.5 million heads in 1940 to 4.3 million in 
1947.60 The Japanese army purchased many for slaughter. The meat was used for food 
and the leather was urgently needed for the production of shoes and boots. Especially in 
1944 farmers preferred to slaughter their cattle themselves, rather than sell them to the 
Japanese against rapidly depreciating prices. Moreover, the work of the colonial 
Veterinary Service in preventing the spread of diseases almost came to a standstill, which 
enhanced contagious diseases. The decline indicates that less land could be ploughed and 
harrowed and that the preparation of fields became less meticulous. Both contributed to a 
fall in food production. 
 
Demise of Transport and Communications 
Before the war goods in bulk were mainly transported by rail in Java. During the 
occupation the Japanese military government ordered complete trains, including 
locomotives and operating personnel, carriages, wagons and rails, to be shipped out of 
                     
57.  Kishi and Nishijima (1963) p.313. 
58.  Oki and Reid (1986) p.247. 
59.  De Jong (1985) pp.522-523; Brugmans (1960) pp.280-281; Kishi and Nishijima (1963) 
p.316. 
60.  Metcalf (1952) p.85; ‘Kort Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling van de Economische Situatie in 
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Pierre van der Eng 
 
24 
Java to Sumatra, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma and Indochina.61 There is no exact 
overview of the decline in railway transport capacity in Indonesia, but Table 3 
summarises the pre and post-war situation, and confirms a substantial loss in capacity. 
 
Table 3: Rolling Railway Stock in Java, 1939, 1947, 1951 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
 Locomotives Carriages Wagons 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
1939 1,202 3,329 25,332 
1947   295 1,031 10,422 
1951   882 2,470 20,190 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Sources: ‘Economische Toestand’ (1947) p.27; Statistical Pocketbook (1953). 
 
Table 4: Number of Motor Vehicles in Indonesia, 1940-1950 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
  Passenger Buses Utility Vans 
     Cars   and Trucks 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
December 1940 Java 40,325 1,639  5,726 
 Other Islands 16,027 4,820   5,196 
 Indonesia 56,352 6,459 10,922 
 
October 1945 Dutch Indonesia  1,180    -  1,442 
June 1947 Dutch Indonesia  6,100    36  9,600 
December 1947 Dutch Indonesia 10,281 1,134 10,446 
December 1948 Dutch Indonesia 13,549 2,636 11,675 
 
December 1949 Indonesia 31,046 7,643 21,649 
December 1950 Indonesia 39,435 8,474 27,085 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Note: Dutch Indonesia refers to area under Allied or Dutch colonial control. 
Sources: Statistical Pocketbook (1941, 1953); Economisch Weekblad (1949) p.599. 
 
 
 As far as road vehicles were concerned, all civilians were obliged to register their 
motor vehicles and petrol stocks in June 1942. The Japanese authorities confiscated large 
numbers of these vehicles and stocks. Many cars and trucks were shipped out of Java, 
others fell in disrepair. Moreover, hardly any petrol was shipped to Java, which means 
that it was difficult to keep the remaining cars and trucks going. There were some 
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experiments at sugar factories to produce butanol from sugar as a substitute for petrol, but 
the overall effect was marginal.62 As railway transport, there is no exact information 
available, but Table 4 provides an indication. 
 On the whole it seems therefore likely that the increasing shortage of means of 
transportation in Java contributed to difficulties in the rice purchase and distribution 
system. Apart from the Japanese attempts to control the Javanese rice economy, declining 
transport must have been a significant additional reason for declining food production.  
 
 
4. Measuring Food Supply, 1940-1950 
 
The Figures 2 and 3 show that the net supply of calories and proteins increased in 1941 
and 1942, although the share of rice in total calorie supply declined slightly. The increase 
in 1942 was to a large extent caused by the cancellation of cassava-based exports. Before 
World War II Java was one of the major suppliers of cassava starch and dried cassava 
chips to the world market, exporting about 10-15% of cassava production. These 
quantities were available for domestic consumption in 1942. There was a fall in food 
supply during 1943 and food supply became very critical in 1944 and remained so in 
1945 and 1946. The fall in food supply was largely due to a decline in the production of 
non-rice food crops. 
 1944 Was a drought year with considerable failures of the main rice crop and a 
prolonged dry season. In March 1944 the Japanese authorities are said to have claimed 
the following increases in the production of irrigated rice: 9% in West Java, 20% in 
Central Java and 21% in East Java, or an average of 17%.63 Given the official data on 
which Table A.1 is based, and the qualitative information about crop failures, these 
figures are unrealistic and may only have served propagandistic purposes. The available 
data do not indicate exactly how much production decreased.64 As mentioned above, 
                     
62.  Rodenburg (1947) p.25. 
63.  Kishi and Nishijima (1963, pp.265 and 276), quoting Jawa Shimbun (30 March 1944). 
However, the original source only mentions the expected increases in rice production during 1944 
due to newly introduced production procedures.  
64.  Appendix 1 explains that I disagree with suggestions that the available food production 
statistics are entirely unreliable. I strongly disagree with Frederick’s (1990, p.127) assertion ‘that 
actual production was higher at the end of the occupation than before it’ in East Java. There is no 
evidence with general validity to support such a suggestion. Frederick based his statement on a 
Japanese report which suggested that in 1945 60% of the rice crop was used for hoarding. This 
very crude estimate was based on an approximation of production of 4.5 million ton, of which 0.9 
million tons was officially purchased. Farmers were allowed to keep 20% or 0.9 million ton, which 
left 2.7 million tons, or 60%. (IA-RIOD, No.005374) Without substantiation, Frederick calls this ‘a 
conservative guess’. He fails to see that 0.9 million ton for about 34.4 million farmers and their 
families (70% of 49.2 million people in Java) makes only 72 grams per capita per day. Apparently 
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farmers may have started to conceal production from local authorities in order to evade 
forced deliveries, and local Indonesian officials omitted to report production in order to 
obtain rice for the black market. But it is very unlikely that rice production increased in 
1944. 
 
 
Figure 2: Available Calories in Java, 1940-1950 (Kcal per Capita per Day) 
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Source: Table A.3.1. 
 
 
 Apart from 1944, 1946 and 1950 are also known to have been years with poor 
harvests. The official figures reveal incredibly low production levels in 1945 and 1946, 
due to falls in both yields and harvested areas. This leads to the assumption that during 
these years a significant part of the actual production was not registered. For those two 
years production is corrected in the tables A.1 and A.3.2 for the decline in yields in the 
official figures, on the assumption that the decline in planted and harvested area was real, 
because both could easily be checked with random rough estimates. 
 
                                                  
most of the 60% for ‘hoarding’ was used by farm households for survival. 
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Figure 3: Available Protein in Java, 1940-1950 (Grams per Capita per Day) 
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Source: Table A.3.1. 
 
 
 Table A.3.2 and Figure 4 provide an indication of the regional distribution of the 
net supply of the six main food crops. This suggests that average food supply was 
sufficient in some residencies throughout the Japanese occupation, especially in the 
residencies of Semarang, Kedu and Besuki. After 1943 food production in these areas 
seems to have fallen to a level which may have been sufficient to feed the populations in 
these residencies, but which may not have left very much for export to other parts of Java. 
The situation appears to have been especially bad in Bojonegoro and West Java. Food 
supply was already a problem in pre-war Bojonegoro.65 The people in the residency must 
therefore have suffered considerably. This statement is corroborated by the fact that 
mortality rates were around 4% in 1944.66  
 
                     
65.  Penders (1984). 
66.  De Vries (1947) p.18. 
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Figure 4: Available Calories from Six Main Staple Crops in Java, 1941-1946 (Kcal per 
Capita per Day) 
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Note: In contrast to Figure 2, this chart only includes rice, maize, sweet potatoes, cassava, 
peanuts and soybeans and does not include calories from sugar, copra, palm oil, meat, 
fish and vegetables and fruits. The supply of calories from rice and the other staples for 
Java as a whole is higher than in Figure 2, because it is not corrected for net exports from 
Java. 
Source: Table A.3.2. 
 
 
 The decline of food production in West Java may indicate the extent to which the 
main urban centres in West Java (Jakarta, Bogor and Bandung) used to rely on an inflow 
of rice from elsewhere in Java. The first signs of food shortages were not reported until 
August 1943 in the cities Jakarta and Semarang and in the residencies Madiun, Madura, 
Kediri and Surabaya. In reaction, the Japanese authorities announced plans for the 
establishment of a more controlled system of rice distribution in Java in September 1943. 
It is therefore likely that the rigorous restrictions on food trade and the defective rice 
purchase system started to inhibit the allocation mechanism of the free market and the 
spread of food from surplus to the deficit areas at the end of 1943.  
 Per capita food supply in Java of 1,550-1,580 Kcal/day during 1944-1946 was 
clearly very low, because average calorie requirements of people in Java in the 1940s can 
be put at about 1,925 Kcal/day.67 However, the shortfall in supply does not automatically 
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imply widespread starvation. The occurrence of starvation depends on two factors:  
 
• the ways in which people adapt their physical activities to their energy intake levels; 
• the distribution of available food supplies in society. 
 
 Pre-war Indonesia was still at a low average level of living, which implied that most 
people were not employed full-time throughout the year. Moreover, most income 
opportunities at such levels depend very much on the amount of physical labour people 
can perform. In pre-war Indonesia most people were engaged in agriculture, which 
required considerable inputs of physical labour because mechanisation was virtually non-
existent. Besides, agricultural labour is very seasonal. By definition people with their 
main source of income in agriculture are not employed full-time. Additional off-farm 
income opportunities were generally unskilled menial jobs for men and jobs in petty trade 
for women. Both also required physical labour. Hence, income and calorie consumption 
were closely related.  
 For instance, the average daily requirement of about 1,925 Kcal/capita assumes that 
adult men require 2,530 Kcal (20-40 year), which implies a surplus for physical activity 
beyond the basal metabolic rate (BMR) of 1,080 Kcal. This is sufficient for a man to 
perform 4.5 hours of moderately heavy work per day.68 During 1944-1946 average 
calorie supply was 19% below the average requirement. Assuming that lower food supply 
did not affect food allocation in the average household, the man in this example may still 
have consumed enough calories to meet his BMR requirement, but his energy surplus 
only allowed him to perform 3.7 hours of moderately heavy work per day. It is very likely 
that people adapted their work hours during the 1940s to available consumable energy, 
because most qualitative evidence indicates that off-farm job opportunities diminished in 
Java during the Japanese occupation and that rural households were pushed into self-
sufficiency.  
 The average supply during 1944-1946 may therefore have been sufficient for the 
survival of the population in Java as a whole, but that implicitly assumes that food 
supplies were distributed equally. Engel’s Law generalises the experience that poor 
people tend to consume less calories than rich people. Hence, the effect of a fall in 
average food supply depends very much on how the lower total supplies are distributed 
among the different groups of income earners in society. Unfortunately there are no data 
                                                  
corrected for age-sex composition of the population. The average requirement was 1,962 Kcal/day 
in 1950. The difference was most likely caused by the fall in birth rates in Java during the period 
1940-1950, which increased the average age of the population. The average requirement for the 
whole of Indonesia may have been slightly lower, given the generally higher population growth in 
the Other Islands. In 1961 average requirement was indeed 1,889 Kcal/day for the whole of 
Indonesia. 
68.  Van der Eng (1993) pp.28-29. 
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on e.g. income distribution which allow a clear-cut analysis. We have to make do with an 
impressionistic interpretation. As mentioned in above, Japanese food policies were meant 
to enhance a redistribution of food supplies in Indonesia to the following groups. 
 
Japanese Military 
The rice requirements of the Japanese army and civil servants depended most of all on 
the number of Japanese in Java, because transport problems soon ended plans to turn 
Java into the rice bowl for the Japanese army throughout the region. The number of 
Japanese in Java varied according to the state of warfare at the Eastern front. For 
instance, at the end of the war there were more soldiers in East Indonesia than during the 
preceding years, because of the attacks by the Allied Forces in Irian Jaya and Kalimantan. 
The available data do not make a clear distinction between civilians and armed forces. 
The number of Japanese in Indonesia in August 1945 can be put at 74,000 in Java, 
75,150 in Sumatra and 170,000 in East Indonesia.69 Each of the Japanese was estimated 
to require 640 grams of rice per day.70 Hence, for 1945 17,300 tons of rice were needed 
for Japanese consumption in Java, 17,550 tons in Sumatra and 39,700 tons in East 
Indonesia.71 
 The Japanese authorities in Java also required rice for direct war purposes. When it 
appeared in 1944 that the advance of the Japanese forces had been stopped and that the 
war would perhaps have to be fought in Java, the military requested 17,000 tons for 
stockpiling. For 1945 the Japanese authorities also had to deal with the request from the 
7th Army in Singapore for no less than 100,000 tons of rice in preparations for a 
prolonged battle of Singapore.72 But it is unclear how much rice was actually shipped. 
 
Civil Service and Indonesian Auxiliary Services 
Most Dutch civil servants were replaced in 1942 and 1943 by Japanese and Indonesians. 
In 1943 it appeared that the Japanese authorities were unable to maintain a balanced 
government budget, although the wages of civil servants had been restricted to certain 
maximums the year before. In March 1943 wage cuts followed. In order to keep the real 
salaries of the civil servants at level, the Japanese authorities started to pay part of the 
                     
69.  Oki and Reid (1986) p.246; Smit (1962) p.29; Dootjes (1946) p.63; Van Mook (1950) 
p.193. Estimates differ. E.g. Kanahele (1967, pp. 65 and 282) gives figures of 45,000-50,000 in 
March 1942, 10,000 in October/November 1942 and 40,000 to 50,000 in 1945. 
70.  Oki and Reid (1986) p.246. 
71.  One source says that in 1944 the Japanese army in Java required 150,000 tons of rice, which 
was estimated to be 3% of the harvest. (Statement of General Yamamoto, ‘Meeting on Board 
H.M.S. Cumberland’ (21 September 1945) Van der Plas, no.122) This is most likely a mistake. 
Perhaps the estimate concerned stalk paddy purchased in Java for consumption by the Japanese 
armed forces in Indonesia as a whole. 
72.  Oki and Reid (1986) p.246.  
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salaries in the form of rice. During the 1930s there were about 100,000 civil servants. 
Assuming a similar number during the 1940s and daily rations of 500 grams, results in 
total requirement of 18,250 tons. 
 In 1943 about 2.0 million Indonesians served the Japanese as heihos (Indonesian 
auxiliary soldiers), keibodan (Indonesian auxiliary police), giyuguns (Indonesian volun-
teer soldiers), romushas and temporary workers, in 1944 2.6 million, of whom 0.7 
million temporary workers.73 Many of these Indonesians enlisted because of the prospect 
of guaranteed food rations. Assuming that all but the occasional workers required 250 
grams per day, and that the occasional workers required rations for three months per year, 
the required total would have been 188,600 tons. 
 
Detainment Camps 
During the first few months after the Japanese victory in March 1942 European civilians 
and POWs were detained in many different camps, which were established in a hurry, and 
in prisons. There were no uniform rules. Hence, both quality and quantity of food supply 
differed very much. Later that year it appeared that the war was going to last longer than 
the Japanese had initially expected. Larger camps were established and the supply of food 
was more or less standardised. The official daily per capita requirements were estimated 
as follows:74 
 
Rice 570 grams 2,050 Kcal 
Meat  50 grams   450 Kcal 
Vegetables 400 grams   160 Kcal 
Cooking Oil  25 grams   225 Kcal 
Sugar  20 grams      75 Kcal 
Total  2,960 Kcal 
 
Children under 11 years of age were to receive half this ration. The Japanese military 
government intended to supply the following quantities daily rations per capita from army 
stocks:75 
 
Rice 100 grams   360 Kcal 
Starch 200 grams   720 Kcal 
Sugar  20 grams      75 Kcal 
Total  1,155 Kcal 
 
These rations were to be supplied by the camp management through the camp shop. The 
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value of the total requirements per day were estimated by the Japanese to be 25 cents. 
The value of the supplies from army stocks was estimated at 8 cents. Each detainee there-
fore received 17 cents per day, which could be spent on additional food. This food was 
either bought by the camp management, or supplied by indigenous and Chinese traders 
allowed to come into the camps. Or food was purchased collectively outside the camps.  
 The rations supplied by the camp management were not uniform. At maximum they 
amounted to an equivalent of 1,600 Kcal, of which 300-350 grams of rice, or rice 
supplemented with starchy food products to 300-350 grams.76 Upon arrival in the camps 
about 10% to 15% of the promised rations was mostly missing.77 The minimum of these 
rations was about 1,100 Kcal, with occasional declines down to 800 Kcal in 1944.78 In 
June 1944 still about 400 Kcal could be bought with the mentioned 17 cents.79 On top of 
that food was smuggled into the camps and paid for with private money. But the quality 
of the food deteriorated quickly and some products became impossible to obtain. In 
January 1945 the purchased extras still amounted to about 160 Kcal, but soon the 17 
cents were insufficient to buy anything. At that stage the detainees had to take refuge to 
emergency measures, such as selling off belongings and smuggling money and food into 
the camps. The effect of these actions depended on the food situation in the area and the 
safety measures taken by the camp management.80 
 POWs received a better treatment in the beginning of the occupation than civilian 
detainees, because there was a standard regulation for them. It took until March 1943, 
before this regulation was formally also applied to the civilian camps. In the prisons there 
was no system in concern of the rations, the situation there was generally much worse.81  
 In total there were 83,000 civilian detainees in Java, 13,200 in Sumatra and 3,110 in 
East Indonesia, of whom respectively 13%, 10% and 7% died in captivity.82 There were 
42,233 POWs in the whole of Indonesia, of whom 19% died in captivity. The Japanese 
arrested about 15,000 people (Indonesians, Chinese and Europeans) who were kept in 
prisons. About 5,000 of them were executed and about 7,000 died in captivity.83 
Assuming an average ration of 300 grams of rice per day for all these people, the annual 
rice requirement for detainees and POWs was 17,150 tons in 1942 and 13,600 in 1945. 
 
Distribution to the Indonesian Population 
During 1942 and 1943 the general food situation was not alarming, because of the good 
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harvests, the available emergency stocks and the stoppage of cassava exports. Until 1944 
the members of the organisation of rice wholesalers, BOK, delivered the rice to the 
neighbourhood shops at the request of the community councils. The declining rice 
production did not only induce the Japanese authorities to introduce a more rigorous 
purchase system in August 1943. Essential to the system was control over all rice 
supplies, which implied centralised allocation of rice surpluses. At the same time plans 
for a system to distribute rice to individual Indonesian civilians, rather than to entire 
neighbourhoods was announced. In essence, the distribution system had to replace the 
entire free market system through which surplus rice used to reach the deficit areas, in 
particular the urban centres.  
 The amount of rice required each month for distribution to the civilian population 
was estimated with assumptions about the consumed quantity of rice, from which a rough 
estimate of local production was subtracted. The distribution system was therefore mainly 
aimed at the urban centres. For instance, the city of Jakarta was supposed to need 200 
grams per person per day, whereas small provincial towns received allotments of 100 to 
150 grams per person per day. With this system the Japanese authorities estimated the 
monthly requirements per residency for 1945 as follows:84 
 
Banten  1,200 Pekalongan  2,500 Madiun  1,000 
Jakarta (residency)  3,000 Semarang  3,200 Bojonegoro  1,200 
Jakarta (city)  5,800 Pati  1,500 Surabaya  6,700 
Bogor  4,000 Banyumas  1,200 Kediri  3,300 
Prianggan  5,500 Kedu  1,500 Malang  4,000 
Cirebon  1,600 Yogyakarta  1,000 Besuki  2,500 
           .  Surakarta   1,500 Madura   2,050 
West Java 21,100 Central Java 12,400 East Java 20,750 
 
 For the whole of Java this was 54,250 tons per month, or 651,000 tons per year. 
With an average ration of 250 grams per capita per day, this implies that at least 7.1 
million people, or about 15% of the population in Java, depended on the distribution 
system. The actual supply of rice depended on the extent to which BOK and its members 
indeed managed to purchase and transport rice. Given that rations were often smaller than 
250 grams per day, the number of people in the distribution system may have been 
higher. 
 An individual distribution system was introduced in Bandung in March 1943.85 In 
Jakarta the individual distribution of rice started on 1 January 1944. It was soon followed 
by the other urban centres. In most areas the system was based on ration cards which 
were handed out to registered population via a newly established tight network of 
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Japanese-style neighbourhood groups.86 The distributed rice rations amounted to 200-250 
grams per day at first, but they soon became smaller. The rations gradually declined 
during the lean season of 1944 to 150-200 grams in the major cities and 50-100 grams in 
country towns. The first major food shortages were reported in April-May 1944, prior to 
the wet season harvest. Late 1944 the following rations per capita per day applied in 
some urban areas: Jakarta 120 grams; Garut, adults 120 grams, children under 10 years 
60 grams; Pekalongan 230 grams; Kediri 150 grams; Bojonegoro, adults 200 grams and 
children under 10 years 150 grams.87 Sometimes the distribution had to be suspended, 
because there was no rice available for distribution.  
 The declining distribution rations meant that people were forced to buy 
supplementary food on the black market. After the very poor harvest during the 1944 dry 
season, famines were reported in the traditionally rice deficient areas in Java, such as 
Bojonegoro.88 These famines continued well into 1945, because of the delayed wet 
season harvest. The Japanese authorities were unable to prevent or alleviate these rural 
disasters. The purchase of rice was insufficient in many rural areas, because of the low 
harvest in 1944 and the disrupted transport system. Food stocks ran out and the food 
situation became disquieting in many urban areas as well, when the food rations had to be 
cut down.   
 Summarising, in 1945 the annual rice requirements of the Japanese authorities in 
Java may have been: 
 
For civilian use - civil service    18,250 tons 
 - Indonesian auxiliary forces   188,600 tons 
 - detainment camps    13,600 tons 
 - distribution   651,000 tons 
For military use - Java    17,300 tons 
 - Strategic Stockpiling    17,000 tons 
 - Singapore    100,000 tons 
Total  1,005,750 tons 
 
This estimate is relatively accurate. Available official estimates suggest that the total 
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purchase targets for 1945 was 0.7 million tons of milled rice for civilian use and 0.2 
million tons for military use.89  
 It is very likely that food supply was adequate for about 70% of the population who 
worked in agriculture and may have had direct access to food products. The pre-war rice 
surplus had been about 30% of production, which implies that the majority of the people 
in agriculture were not very far from subsistence production. Given the rapid depreciation 
of real official purchase prices, the increasing discrepancy between official and black 
market prices and the extortion of supplies by corrupt officials, farm households may 
have chosen to limit food production to subsistence levels, producing enough to meet 
their own requirements and the official quota. 
 Table A.3.2 is one indication in this direction. It shows that the fall of per capita 
calorie supply stopped in 1944 and stabilised during the years 1944-1946 in most 
residencies. But a simple calculation may also illustrate the assumption that farm 
households cut production close to subsistence levels. In 1945 about 1 million tons of rice 
was delivered to the rice mills. Assuming a 100% mark-up because of embezzlement and 
hoarding, 2 million tons of paddy may have been delivered to the kumiai. Production was 
6.5 million tons of paddy. If 70% of the population had access to land in 1945, farm 
households may have produced for food for 34.4 million people. Hence, 665 Kcal per 
capita may have been available in farm households from rice. It is likely that a much 
larger percentage of the other food crops was consumed by the agricultural households 
than their share of 70% in total population suggests, because of the trade restrictions. 
Supposing that 90% of total calorie supply from other food products listed in Table A.3.1 
would have been consumed by agricultural households, total food supply would have 
been 1,900 Kcal per capita. Average requirements fell most likely due to declining off-
farm income opportunities. Hence, it is very well possible that the agricultural population 
would have been able to sustain a 30% rice delivery quotum despite the considerable 
decline in food production shown in Table A.1. Farm households had sufficient supplies 
and delivery quota were met, but there was little food in the markets. 
 On the basis of the 1930 population census, we may assume that by 1942 about 
10% of the population in Java lived in urban areas. These people would partly rely on the 
distribution system for their food supply, augmenting their rations with what they could 
purchase on the black market. Although the real wages of employees and civil servants 
fell, most of them were able to sell belongings such as clothes, textiles, jewellery and 
furniture in order to purchase supplementary foods. As shown above, the number of 
people in the government distribution scheme may have been 15% of the population. 
 This leaves 15% of the population, or about 7.5 million people. It is likely that most 
of them were the rural landless. In the pre-war years the people in this group relied on 
income from wage labour, with which they had been able to buy food. But after 1942 
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their income opportunities decreased, when exports became impossible and strict 
regulations prohibited free domestic shipments of products. Many of these people may 
have enlisted voluntarily as romushas. But this alternative to poverty soon became less 
attractive, when stories seeped through about the harsh treatment of many romushas. A 
large number of these people most likely moved to the cities in an attempt to find work.90 
In the cities they settled in the poor kampungs, where they were beyond control of the 
community councils and the neighbourhood groups. They were therefore not in the rice 
distribution system.  
 The 1944 statistics of the Japanese-style neighbourhood groups and Table A.2.1 
make it possible to estimate the actual size of this group of poor people.91 The survey 
total of 43.9 million people in Java is most likely too low. With the available population 
census data for 1930 and 1961, these data would imply implausible annual average 
growth rates of 0.38% during 1930-1944 and 5.28% during 1944-1961. A comparison 
per residency of the 1944 survey data and the estimates in Table A.2.1 shows that the 
differences are concentrated in the residencies with major cities, except Prianggan and 
Yogyakarta. For Jakarta the estimate in Table A.2.1 is 48% higher than the survey, for 
Cirebon 51%, Semarang 12%, Surabaya 59% and Malang 19%. Otherwise the 
differences range between -9.6% (Besuki) and 6.4% (Banten). Without the residencies 
with the major cities, except Prianggan and Yogyakarta, the difference between the sub-
totals of the survey and the estimates in Table A.2.1 is only 0.5%. Hence, it is likely that 
the absolute differences between the 1944 survey and the estimates in Table A.2.1 
indicate the numbers of people who were not in the distribution system in the residencies 
with the major cities. If these people resided in the cities and their immediate 
surroundings, they numbered as follows: Jakarta 1,727,000; Surabaya 1,538,000; Cirebon 
1,249,000; Malang 524,000; Semarang 282,000 and Bandung 103,000. All together 5.6 
million people.  
 It is therefore not surprising that the first reports of food shortages in 1943 were 
from urban centres, such as Jakarta, Surabaya, Madiun, Semarang and Kediri. In the 
worst case poor people in the rural areas could still eat snails, banana roots and forest 
plants, but in the cities the only alternative was to beg in the streets for money. There are 
indeed descriptions of contemporary observers which suggest that where beggars were 
hardly seen in pre-war years, the number of poorly fed and scantly dressed beggars in the 
cities increased rapidly during 1944.92 Certainly for Jakarta there are descriptions of 
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increased human suffering at the end of 1944.  
 It is only possible to speculate about the extent of human suffering and the extent to 
which the food situation changed for this part of the population. The unregistered black 
market seems to have flourished. Some traders may have made a small fortune. But the 
reports about famine and malnourishment, in particular in urban areas make it unlikely 
that the black market compensated the deficiencies in the official distribution system. 
Bulk transport became increasingly difficult. Some small traders may have managed to 
avoid controls on the transport of food stuffs, but it is difficult to imagine that small hauls 
with carts and bicycles could replace bulk transport by truck and railway to deficit areas. 
 
Figure 5: Average Heights of Children in Jakarta and Central Java, 1935-1949 
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Gorter and De Haas (1947). The series of heights of boys was extended with the average 
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 The effect of deteriorating food supply can be illustrated with the heights of 
children. Human growth during childhood is very sensitive to changes in food supply and 
the disease environment. Malnutrition and diseases cause growth stunting in children. 
Figure 5 indicates that young Indonesian children in Jakarta in 1944/45 were significantly 
smaller than their peers in 1935/40. Male heights at the age of 15-18 hardly differed, 
which suggests that the causes of the decline of average heights between both periods 
were of very recent date. The heights of Indo-European orphans evacuated from areas 
previously under Republican control in Central Java, suggest appalling neglect and 
hardship during the years of war and revolution. The survey data collected for Jakarta in 
1944-45 do not give the impression of rampant starvation. As explained above, on 
average food supply in Java was adequate for survival. Therefore most people, except the 
poor, managed to survive. But there certainly was malnutrition in Jakarta. The 1944-45 
survey found that only 10.3% of the children between 5-9 years, 26.9% of the 10-14 year 
olds and 33.5% of the 15-19 year olds were healthy.93 The rest was suffering from 
various ailments. Given that especially young children are susceptible, these data are 
indicative of diminishing resistance against common diseases. 
 It seems that the poor bore the brunt of the diminishing food supply. Cut off from 
income opportunities and regular food supply, their ultimate fate during the Japanese 
occupation was to starve along the roadside.94 Many of them may indeed have perished 
this way, because available evidence indicates an overall decline of the population in Java 
during the years 1944 and 1945. During those years about 2.4 million people died on top 
of the normal mortality rate.95 It seems likely that most of these deaths occurred in the 
group of 7.5 million who were deprived of a regular supply of food. 
 On the whole, it is improbable that the volume of the Japanese military demands 
caused food shortages in Indonesia.96 It is also unlikely that Japanese food policies in 
Java contributed significantly to a redistribution of available food supplies. It is very 
plausible that the rigorous attempts to control food marketing in order to obtain the 
required quantities of rice for distribution purposes impeded a flow of food stuffs from 
areas where farmers could produce a surplus to deficit areas. As explained above, direct 
government control over food supply was not the only reason for the failure of the 
distribution mechanism. Low purchase prices, deteriorating production circumstances and 
increasing transport impediments are additional explanations. Figure 3 has indicated that 
per capita food supply stabilised during 1944-1946 in each of the three provinces in Java. 
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It is therefore likely that many farmers adhered to subsistence production with only a 
small surplus to serve the local rural economy. Hence, food shortages and human 
suffering were not caused by the requisitioning of rice by the authorities, but by the 
impediments imposed on the trade and transport of food stuffs. 
 The next chapter will indicate that similar reasons help to explain the changes in 
food supply in Java during the years 1946-1950. The rice purchase system maintained in 
the areas under Republican control most likely was a disincentive for farmers to step up 
the production of a food surplus. In the second half of 1947 large parts of Java were 
brought under Dutch control. The continued hostilities between Republican and Dutch 
armed forces may have increased insecurity in rural areas, which may have kept some 
farmers from cultivating their fields. But in general terms it is likely that transport 
facilities and trade opportunities were gradually restored. In December 1948 the 
remaining parts of Java were brought under Dutch control, which meant that the Javanese 
economy was reunited, which no doubt furthered food production even more. It took until 
1980 before per capita food supply in Indonesia recovered to levels comparable to Java 
in 1940.97 An important reason for the retarded recovery was the acceleration in 
population growth, the results of which were very likely already felt in the late 1940s. 
 
 
5. Food Production and Supply during Decolonisation, 1945-1950 
 
The colonial government in exile prepared its return to Indonesia in Australia. It used the 
gold and foreign exchange which had been shipped out of Indonesia before the Japanese 
conquered Java, and loans from the United States, to prepare a relief and rehabilitation 
program.98 In anticipation of the liberation of Indonesia it purchased goods, such as food 
stuffs, textiles and tools, in Australia and the United States. 
 The counter attack of the Allied Forces started from West New Guinea on 22 April 
1944. But recapturing territory was difficult in the jungle. Attention was therefore 
focussed on the counter attack in the Pacific in the direction of the Philippines. A year 
later Australian troops raided and seized the oil island of Tarakan off the coast of East 
Kalimantan. From then on most of East Indonesia was slowly recaptured by the Allied 
Forces. Their task became much easier when Japan surrendered unconditionally on 15 
August 1945, after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Japanese troops in 
Indonesia were ordered to maintain the status quo until the Allied Forces had arrived. The 
Allied Command decided to transfer the command over Indonesia from the United States 
to the British-led South-East Asia Command (SEAC) in Singapore. 
 Before announcing the Japanese surrender in Jakarta on 22 August 1945, the 
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nationalist leaders Sukarno and Hatta to proclaim the independent Republic of Indonesia 
on 17 August. This was the start of a period of chaos and confusion in Java and Sumatra. 
The new government could not establish its authority everywhere at the same time. SEAC 
did not have enough troops ready to enter Indonesia at the end of August. The re-
establishment of colonial rule in East Indonesia went relatively smoothly. The Japanese 
were replaced by Australian troops and later by Dutch military forces. It took until 29 
September before the first British troops were landed in Java and Sumatra with orders to 
disarm and deport the present Japanese, to free prisoners and detainees and establish ‘law 
and order’. But the landed British-Indian Allied Forces met with fierce resistance from 
the Republican armed forces, which used requisitioned Japanese weapons. The British 
had insufficient manpower and means to take control of the rural parts of Java. Moreover, 
the British government did not want to become involved in the budding colonial war 
between the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands. For that reason the presence of the 
British and Indian troops in Java and Sumatra remained restricted to the immediate 
surroundings of the major cities: Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Semarang and Surabaya in 
Java, and Medan, Padang and Palembang in Sumatra.  
 The colonial government returned on 4 October 1945 to Jakarta, where the 
government of the Republic of Indonesia also had its seat, until it moved to Yogyakarta in 
January 1946. Pending the negotiations about the future of Indonesia, there were two 
civilian authorities in the areas under Allied control: Dutch and Indonesian. Peace was 
formally kept during negotiations between the Dutch and the Republicans. Peace was also 
kept, because it took until March 1946 before the Dutch government received permission 
to land military troops in Java and Sumatra. The presence of the British troops lasted until 
December 1946.  
 
The Areas under Republican Control, 1945-1946 
 
In August 1945 the Republican government called for the establishment of a network of 
National Committees, which had their headquarters Komite Nasional Indonesia (KNI) in 
Jakarta. These committees were meant to take over local authority from the Japanese. 
Most of them were established in the urban centres. In the rural areas the traditional 
Indonesian authorities (pangreh praja) continued their offices. One of the tasks of the 
KNI sections was food distribution. Given that communications were defective, many of 
the KNI sections operated independent of the central government. It is therefore difficult 
to generalise food policies in the Republic of Indonesia.  
 Soon after the declaration of independence the government of the Republic 
established the Agency for the Supervision of the People’s Food Supply (Jawatan 
Pengawasan Makanan Rakyat, PMR) of the Ministry of Welfare. Basically, PMR 
continued the work of the Japanese SKZ. The kumiai were still expected to supply paddy 
to the rice mills, which were to work for PMR. The PMR also planned the distribution of 
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rice to the armed forces and the civil servants of the Republic, and to the urban areas. 
According to Japanese information, by 1 September 1945 the stocks at the mills 
amounted to 323,200 tons of rice, of which 47,000 tons were in the hands of licensed rice 
traders.99 This would not be sufficient until the next harvest, so that additional purchases 
of paddy were necessary. But the purchase of paddy virtually ceased in September. 
Purchased stocks of paddy held at the kumiai failed to reach the rice mills, and rice stocks 
held at the rice mills failed to reach the urban areas, mainly because of the confusion 
among the local authorities and the lack of communication.  
 In many areas outside Java Allied control paved the way for a restoration of Dutch 
colonial rule, at first in the form of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) 
and later the Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch (AMACAB). The 
situation was very confused in Java in 1945. Most of Jakarta was controlled by the 
Republican forces until the British SEAC moved in October. All departments and vital 
services remained under Republican control, including food supply and distribution. The 
Indonesian population in Jakarta depended for its food supply to a large extent on the 
Republican municipal administration, the Balai Agung, which obtained rice from 
PMR.100 SEAC recognised the Balai Agung and intended to cooperate with it. Dutchmen 
were employed as advisers to SEAC in Java, or they worked for the Allied organisation 
Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees (RAPWI) or the Red Cross.  
 The Indonesian government had its seat in Jakarta until January 1946. Until then 
PMR purchased the food it required for distribution mainly in Jakarta’s surrounding 
districts, especially Kerawang. The account of food supply in the area under Republican 
control will be concentrated on the situation in Jakarta, because it is hitherto the best 
documented area.101 It appears that the system of rice purchase and supply did not work 
very well. The Balai Agung itself stated that it was difficult to organise the transports of 
rice due to the hectic situation east of Jakarta, where many rice mills had been neglected. 
There was also a chronic shortage of capable personnel and of money to finance the 
purchase of rice.102 Moreover, transports of food stuffs were difficult, because of the 
presence of irregular armed gangs, who tried to seize commodities for black market trade, 
or who were for political reasons opposed to food transports to areas with SEAC 
presence. If organised transports were not disrupted, the gangs most likely managed to 
disrupt private trade of small quantities of food stuffs into Jakarta.103 In December 1945 
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the Committee for the Organisation of the People’s Food (Badan Urusan Makanan 
Rakyat, BUMA), a local organisation, took over the purchase of rice for Jakarta from 
PMR. But the situation did not change very much. The Republican organisations 
regularly had to ‘borrow’ imported rice from the Allied Food Control Board.104   
 After the government of the Republic had left for Yogyakarta, the work of the 
Republican organisation for food supply in Jakarta became increasingly defective. 
Republican troops surrounding Jakarta imposed a food blockade. The Balai Agung left 
the organisation of food supply to cooperatives, various small companies and private 
traders, which were given permits to purchase and transport rice. But the Balai Agung 
soon lost control over the situation, because supervision became almost impossible. 
Consequently, private rice traders, especially Chinese, who paid more than the official 
purchase prices, took over the supply of rice to the Indonesian population in Jakarta, 
although this was officially not allowed. The supply of rice improved, but only at the 
black market, where the prices were high.  
 The food blockade of the Republican forces on Jakarta started to cause serious 
problems after August 1946. The Balai Agung announced several changes in the food 
supply system. On 1 September 1946 rice imports were monopolised by the Section for 
Rice Imports (Bagian Impor Makanan) of the Department of Economic Affairs of the 
Balai Agung, but results were not noticed. On 3 November 1946 the Balai Agung 
established yet another body for the organisation of the rice supply to Jakarta. 
Representatives of the Department of Prosperity, the banks, local administration, the 
regular army and the irregular ‘combat groups’ were represented in this organisation. It 
would purchase and transport rice to Jakarta and supply it to the municipal government. 
Next to that, the Central Organisation of Cooperatives (Pusat Usaha Kooperasi) in 
Jakarta was allowed to purchase rice. Both organisations would purchase the rice and 
transport it to Jakarta, after which it would be supplied to the Republican authorities in 
the city, who would distribute it in the city.  
 In September the new organisation purchased not more than 141.5 ton rice, 113 ton 
paddy and 20 ton stalk paddy, which was obviously much too low to set up any fair 
distribution in Jakarta.105 Consequently, the Republican authorities in Jakarta could only 
organise a supply of 200 grams of rice per person once every three to four months. 
People who were supposed to benefit from the distribution system relied heavily on the 
black market. An additional reason for the declining supply of food for distribution could 
have been the increasing corruption of Republican civil servants. In November 1946 it 
appeared that they had supplied their meagre income by taking bribes and embezzling 
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supplies and selling them on the black market.106 In order to relieve the situation, the 
Dutch municipal council gradually incorporated distribution of food to part of the 
Indonesian population in the city, aiming at a daily supply of about 200 grams of rice per 
capita at a price of 12 cents per litre. The Balai Agung continued to exist, but in the end 
the colonial authorities took over responsibility for food supply to the Indonesian 
population in the areas under its control. 
 The task of securing food supply in Yogyakarta became increasingly difficult, 
because the population in the city expanded quickly with the inflow of refugees, troops 
and government officials. Moreover, the 1946 harvest was hardly better than the 1945 
harvest. Firstly, because the planting for the wet season of 1945/46 was delayed for two 
months due to the insecure situation in many areas. Secondly, there was a shortage of 
labour, due to the fact that young people joined the fight against the Dutch. Consequently, 
not much could be done about the state of disrepair of the irrigation facilities, or about the 
problem of rats, boars and birds ruining the crops in the field. Transport restrictions were 
formally lifted, but major problems remained. For instance, 40% of the railway loco-
motives had been lost and 50% damaged, 70% of the pre-war number of trucks and cars 
had disappeared and 25% had been damaged.107 Thirdly, many farmers did not dare to 
cultivate all their fields, because the rural areas were unsafe.  
 Rural unsafety was not so much caused by the hostilities between Republican and 
Allied forces, but mainly by the fact that many of the deprived rural poor had joined 
irregular armed gangs, which roamed the countryside. They held up official food 
transports and requisitioned food at will from farmers. The gangs often paid lip-service to 
the Indonesian revolution by calling themselves laskar rakyat. Farmers may indeed have 
handed over food as their contribution to the struggle for independence in many cases. 
But generally the gangs had to use a range of ways to persuade them to hand over 
supplies, which made farmers reluctant to cultivate more food than for their own needs.  
 PMR did not function on the basis of voluntary purchase of rice via the rice mills, 
like the pre-war VMF. It simply followed the procedures of its Japanese predecessor. It 
relied entirely on the local pangreh praja. Farmers were obliged to hand over 20% of the 
rice harvest, of which half was considered to be a special ‘war tax’. For the other half the 
farmers were supposed to be paid. The purchased paddy had to be supplied to the rice 
mills which were controlled by PMR. The Bank Rakyat Indonesia lent money for the 
purchase of rice to PMR, which passed it on to the heads of each residency. They in turn 
had to pass it on to the lower administrative levels.  
 There are several indications which suggest that the system did not work properly 
and that there was resentment among farmers. Firstly, the real value of the compensation 
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which the local officials had to pay was soon eroded by inflation. Secondly, the underpaid 
pangreh praja often embezzled money.108 In several areas there was therefore insufficient 
money to compensate farmers according to the official guidelines. Hence, some officials 
resorted to pressure in order to convince farmers to deliver part of their harvest. It 
appears that the requisitioning of rice was entirely arbitrary.109 Combined with tactless 
behaviour of the local officials, the appropriation of rice incited widespread 
dissatisfaction among farmers in East Java.110 
 The original intention was to feed the regular Republican army with rice from the 
20% of the harvest purchased by the PMR. It turn, farmers were to expect some 
protection against the laskar rakyat. But the army failed to provide the security which 
farmers needed to cultivate and market their crops. This added to the dissatisfaction of 
the farmers.111 
 The system of purchasing rice did not work as expected. In the second half of 1946 
the regular Republican army was also allowed to requisition food from farmers. But it 
paid with rapidly devaluating Republican paper money. In October 1946 the regular 
military forces of the republic were estimated to be 200,000.112 The number of civil 
servants may be put at 100,000.113 It is difficult to estimate the size of all unofficial army 
groups, but during the Japanese occupation there were at least about 1.7 million people in 
different militarised groups.114 If each of them required 500 grams of rice per day, all 
groups together required about 10% of total paddy production in Java in 1946. Hence, it 
is very likely that most Javanese farmers were affected by the purchase of rice by officials 
or armed forces. It is also likely that the armed forces in the Republican areas were not 
supported cordially by the rural population with food donations.115  
 It is difficult to provide indications of the actual food situation in the areas under 
Republican control, because not much information has been preserved. In 1945 Dutch 
reports on the food situation were based on secret intelligence information. The reports 
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anticipated famines prior to the main harvest of 1946.116 Some opportunism may be 
expected in these reports, because they served as a basis for the claims by the Dutch in 
the Combined Food Board (CFB, later the International Emergency Food Council, IEFC) 
in Washington, which allocated the available food supplies in the world during the years 
1945-1950.117 But on the other hand, it is unlikely that the Dutch officials would risk the 
limited international goodwill which the Netherlands had as far as the situation in 
Indonesia was concerned, by exaggerating the bad food situation.  
 In September 1945 the first British report on the situation in Java stated that all 
areas in Java received ‘adequate food supply’ and that there were only some problems in 
concern of transport and seasonal shortages.118 Further reports in October 1945 asserted 
that the food position in Java was fairly good in the East, a bit worse in the Centre and 
poor in the West.119 These notices were most likely based on information obtained from 
Japanese and Indonesian officials, who may not have been familiar with the actual 
situation in various regions.120 In December 1945 the British also anticipated famines in 
Java.121 During the lean season prior to the main harvest of 1946 famines were reported 
in several parts of Prianggan and throughout Sumatra, while rice stocks in Besuki were 
immobilised because of transport problems.122 On the other hand, Western officials 
travelling to Yogyakarta for negotiations stated that the crops in the field looked well and 
that food supply in Yogyakarta was ‘bounteous’.123 It is possible that fields close to the 
roads had been cultivated, but that distant fields remained fallow. Moreover, if rice was 
purchased, it was bound to be distributed in Yogyakarta, the seat of the Republican 
government. 
 There are two Republican reports on the economic situation in Central and East 
Java. Both stated that the general food situation in 1946 was satisfactory and that there 
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were no reasons for alarm.124 But both reports cited, without any special remarks, the 
available official production estimates for 1946. These figures showed no less than a 62% 
decline of production relative to 1941. Reported harvested area can be cross-checked 
with an estimate for 1946 based on a photographic survey into the irrigated area under 
rice by the SEAC intelligence office in May 1946. The survey covered samples of 
districts in Java, altogether 8.5% of the irrigated land in Java. The surprising outcome of 
the comparison in Table 5 is that the survey rendered lower estimates than the official 
figures. It thus seems that the survey figures can be taken as a minimum, and that the 
official figures on harvested area are plausible.125 However, the yields reported in the 
official figures are most likely much too low, for the same reasons as prevalent during the 
Japanese occupation. The survey used 1936/40 average yields, but, given the many 
impediments to food production, this average may be too high. Production is re-estimated 
in Table A.1 with the 1942/43 average yields. 
 
 
Table 5: Irrigated Area under Rice in Java, 1946 (thousand hectares) 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
 Official Survey 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
West Java 1,090 1,028 
Central Java   979   909 
East Java   947   803 
Total 3,016 2,740 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Sources: Geoogste Uitgestrektheden (1947); ‘Photographic Survey of the Rice Producing 
Areas of Java and Madura’ (14 June 1946) FO 371/53889/F9802. 
 
 
 Figure 2 has shown that per capita food supply in 1946 was not much higher than in 
1944 and 1945. The discussion in Chapter 4 has indicated that this supply would have 
been sufficient for survival, if available food would have been distributed equally over all 
regions and all groups in society. But for an even geographical spread about one million 
tons of rice would have had to be transported in bulk. Given the state of disrepair of the 
transport system and the difficulties which PMR encountered in purchasing paddy, it is 
difficult to assume that this indeed happened. Given the fact that serious economic 
recovery was not possible until 1949, there still were insufficient labour opportunities for 
the rural landless and the urban poor. Joining local combat groups and persuading 
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farmers to support them with food was one way of survival. But for most of Indonesia’s 
poor the situation may not have changed very much compared to the Japanese period. 
The food situation in Yogyakarta may have been satisfactory, but out of sight people may 
well have suffered from malnutrition.  
 
The Areas under Allied Control, 1945-1946 
 
After the Japanese surrender the prime obligation of the returning colonial government 
was to alleviate the urgent need for food in the areas under its control, East Indonesia and 
the urban foot-holds in Java and Sumatra. The colonial government had no control over 
the rural areas, which meant that it could not purchase food in the surroundings of the 
cities. It therefore depended on rice imports. Rice was very difficult to obtain on the 
world market. Before the war Burma, Thailand and Indochina exported some 7 million 
tons of rice. But during 1945-1947 the available quantities for export were up to 1.4 
million tons only, at a time when world demand for imported rice was much higher. For 
that reason the Combined Food Board in Washington determined the allocations of food 
products on the world market.  
 In 1945 all countries represented in the board assumed that after the Japanese 
surrender Dutch colonial government would be restored in Indonesia. For that reason the 
Dutch representative could claim amounts of rice for the whole of Indonesia. The original 
claim was 153,200 tons for 1945, of which 102,000 tons for Java. Whatever the alloca-
tions by the Combined Food Board for Indonesia, soon after the Japanese surrender 
supplies entirely depended on whether SEAC would be able to actually purchase rice. By 
August 1945 the British had only advanced as far as Burma. Until September 1945 
nothing was known about the availability of rice for export in Thailand and Indochina, let 
alone about the possibilities of organising such exports at short notice.126 Moreover, the 
foreign purchases the colonial government could not finance itself, had to be purchased 
by the British War Office. Unfortunately the War Office was not as generous with 
financial assistance as the Americans, which was one reason for the stagnation in the 
purchase of supplies.127 But the main reason was that expected stocks in mainland 
Southeast Asia turned out to be much smaller.128 In addition, at the end of October 1945 
the total allocation of 307,000 tons for the entire SEAC area had to be cut back to 
197,000 tons, because of the sudden emergency situation in India, where crop failures 
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caused serious famines and rice was more urgently needed.129 The Indonesian allocation 
was reduced to 56,000 tons, of which 37,000 tons for Java. 
 It took until November 1945, before the first loads of rice arrived in Java. Until then 
the colonial government could only take care of the distribution of rice and supplies in 
East Indonesia. Gradually British troops occupied larger parts of Jakarta in order to bring 
security in an area where Europeans became concentrated. By November 1945 there 
were still about 80,000 Europeans in detainment camps in areas under Republican 
control. These detainees were formally supervised by the RAPWI, which brought them in 
stages to safe areas for passage to Europe.130 The British troops and later the troops of the 
KNIL, the colonial army, brought large parts of Jakarta and its surroundings and parts of 
Bogor and Bandung under their control. The Dutch were allowed to establish local 
sections of civilian administration in the main cities under Allied control. These sections 
were meant to be confined to taking care of the Europeans in the cities. They were also 
responsible for the distribution of largely imported food supplies to Europeans and poor 
Indonesians via RAPWI and the Red Cross. For instance, in Jakarta, where most 
Europeans were concentrated in Java, the local Dutch Office for Municipal Affairs 
(Kantoor voor Gemeentezaken) attended to the distribution of food. 
 For several reasons the Dutch authorities required a more systematic purchase and 
distribution system. Firstly, because the possibilities to import supplies were still very 
much restricted. Secondly, because the demand for food increased. Rice was required as 
an incentive to encourage farmers in the Other Islands to produce cash crops for export 
and earn badly needed foreign exchange. Secondly, the population in the areas under 
Allied control continued to increase rapidly. Next to the Europeans from the detainment 
camps, there was an inflow of Indonesians who tried to escape poverty and violence. 
Moreover, in many of the areas which were taken over from the Republican forces, there 
was a considerable shortage of supplies of all kinds.131 In several cases the Republican 
forces used a ‘scorched earth’ tactic and often the food and health situation in these areas 
required emergency food aid.  
 Most of rural Java remained inaccessible for the Dutch civil authorities. Hence, the 
urban population under the responsibility of the Allies was to a large extent dependent on 
the inflow of food supplies from the areas under Republican control. It not possible to 
give an indication of the extent to which these people managed to purchase unregistered 
supplies from the rural areas, but it is likely that only the people with assets were able to 
barter. Most of the ex-detainees and many of the people working for the British and 
AMACAB may not have had that opportunity. For them the civil authorities were 
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constantly negotiating with the Republican authorities for deliveries to be organised by 
PMR. 
 
Rice for India, 1946 
 
On 12 April 1946 Sjahrir, the Republican Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced that the 
rice harvest in Java would be bountiful enough for the Republic to be able to offer no less 
than 500,000 tons of rice to India, where millions of people were living on the edge of 
starvation. The minister offered a barter trade deal to the Indian government and 
suggested that India would supply textiles and some other commodities, which were 
badly needed in Indonesia. The Indonesian offer upset the colonial government, which 
was struggling at the time to obtain rice allocations from the IEFC for sufficient rice from 
Thailand and the United States in order to feed people in the areas under its control.132 
Republican spokesmen stressed that the 1945/46 wet season harvest of 5 to 7 million tons 
(compared to 4.7 tons in 1941) would be sufficient to deliver the offered quantity to 
India. The British government was sceptical about the existence of a rice surplus in Java. 
But it remained aloof, because it preferred to serve the plight of India to that of the Dutch 
colonial government.133 
 Dutch authorities were dismayed at the prospect of vast supplies leaving Indonesia, 
while the food situation in the areas under Allied control remained precarious. But they 
were in no position to obstruct the transaction. Firstly, because SEAC was still formally 
in charge of Java and Sumatra. Most of all, because the Dutch were entirely dependent on 
the presence of British troops.134 Moreover, at that stage the Dutch did not want to risk 
any major controversy with the government of the young independent state of India, 
pending the issue of decolonisation of Indonesia in the United Nations. Nor did they want 
to risk the very real threat of a formal complete food boycott by the Republic, which 
could have serious negative effects on the precarious food supply. The colonial 
government agreed to the plan, but only after the Indian government had assured that the 
treaty did not imply any formal recognition of the Republic, and that rice would not be 
traded for arms. The 500,000 tons were formally not subject to the IEFC allocation 
scheme, because the Republic of Indonesia was not a member of IEFC. The Indian 
government could therefore even hold out the prospect of supporting the request of the 
Dutch colonial government to IEFC for an extra allocation of rice.  
 The limited transport facilities in the Republic appeared to be a problem. The 
                     
132.  The initial IEFC allocation for Indonesia was 264,000 tons. But total rice requirements of all 
deficit countries amounted to 4,823,000 tons in 1946, whereas total supply was expected to be only 
2,554,000 tons. (Angladette 1966, p.813) Hence, IEFC had to revise the allocations during 1946. 
133.  ‘Details about the Offer of Rice from Indonesia’ (n.d.) FO 371/53870/F7509. See also: FO 
371/53871/F7705; Cribb (1990b) pp.111-112. 
134.  J.H. van Mook to J.H.A. Logemann (7 June 1946) OBNIB Vol.4, pp.420-421. 
Pierre van der Eng 
 
50 
Indian government supplied gunny bags, ships and other transport equipment. It delivered 
200 trucks, including petrol, and 34 lighters to the Republic for the transport of the rice. 
The Dutch government reluctantly agreed, although it feared that these trucks would be 
used for military purposes, which, as later became clear, indeed happened.135 SEAC 
agreed to the delivery of rice to India, although it endorsed the Dutch condition that the 
Republican government had to deliver rice from Republican territory to the areas in Java 
and Sumatra under Allied control in the same quantities as exported to India, in return for 
imported commodities. On 28 July 1946 an agreement was signed between India and the 
Republic. 
 The rice would be delivered at a rate of 11,000 tons per month. Until October 1946 
25,000 tons of rice with a value of ƒ3 million were indeed shipped to India, in return for 
commodities valued at ƒ9 million.136 Shipments of rice stagnated and Indian ships 
remained berthed in Republican harbours for weeks without being loaded. In October 
1946 Sjahrir maintained that the colonial government was causing the delays in transport, 
because it did not hand over railway carriages for transporting paddy. The argument was 
not quite justified, because 92% of the working stock of locomotives, 87% of the 
carriages and 76% of the wagons were in Republican hands.137 After an Indian appeal to 
the Republican government, another 5,000 tons of rice were shipped in December. But in 
total the equivalent of only 54,461 tons of paddy arrived in India from Indonesia during 
1946.138 
 In January 1947 Republican spokesmen could indeed blame the Dutch economic 
blockade for delays, although the colonial government repeatedly stated that it had agreed 
to the fulfilment of the contract.139 By then it became obvious that the Republican 
representatives had exaggerated the expected harvest results and that the main point of 
the whole affair had been to get de-jure international recognition. The Indian government 
urged the Republic to fulfil the agreement. Republican spokesmen maintained that some 
120,000 tons of paddy were ready for transport. But there were no shipments of rice. By 
May 1947 it appeared that at most 45,000 tons of rice had been shipped and the Indian 
government suspended the agreement late May 1947.140 On a visit to India in November 
1947 Sjahrir still maintained that 300,000 tons of rice had been ready for shipment, but 
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that the stocks had been seized by Dutch troops.141 He urged the Indian government to 
protest against the obstruction by the colonial government.142 
 In fact, the Indonesian government faced enormous difficulties in its attempts to 
purchase the paddy for India. The Panitia Beras India of the Department of Agriculture 
and Supplies dealt with the whole matter. The organisation had its main seat in Jakarta 
and had local offices in Cirebon and Jember. It imposed obligatory fixed quota according 
to the top-down approach used during the Japanese occupation. These quota were 
imposed on top of the PMR quota discussed above. Farmers were paid with government 
bonds, which entitled them to special rations of the goods from India, especially textiles. 
But whatever enthusiasm farmers had for the plan to supply rice to India, it may have 
disappeared rapidly, when it appeared that they could not obtain the goods imported from 
India. These goods were used for other purposes.143  
 
The Areas under Dutch Control, 1946-1947 
 
During 1946 the area under Allied control gradually increased and with it the system of 
food purchase and distribution. However, as far as estimates exist, only about 3% of the 
area harvested with the main food crops in Java was controlled by the Dutch.144 Hence, 
food requirements had to be met with rice imported from abroad, or with food stuffs 
imported from areas under Republican control. Hence, food supply in the areas under 
Allied control was very vulnerable. Based on rations of 200 grams per capita per day the 
colonial government estimated that it would need the following imports per month from 
abroad to guarantee a minimum food supply in the areas under its control during 1946:145 
 
January-March  21,400 tons 
April-June  18,350 tons 
July-August  10,000 tons 
September-October  15,000 tons 
November-December    20,000 tons 
Total 209,250 tons 
 
Total rice imports into Java were around 100,000 tons in 1946, which may indicate the 
rice shortage and the dependency on supplies from Republican territory. 
 Prior to the main 1946 rice harvest the VMF was re-established in April 1946. It 
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operated in East Indonesia, where it purchased rice in South Sulawesi and Kalimantan. 
The rice was largely distributed in East Indonesia to the army, navy, police and civil 
service, but also to labourers employed by the colonial government and to oil companies, 
factories and estates. The remainder of its purchases was distributed to the 
neighbourhood shops and to the areas under Allied control in Java and Sumatra. The 
VMF purchases were insufficient to supply these areas according to their requirements. 
They therefore remained dependent on rice imported from the Republican areas. 
 In the beginning of 1946 representatives from both sides discussed the possibility of 
colonial authorities purchasing rice in the area under control of the Republic through 
PMR. There were some deliveries, but a formal agreement was not reached. The Dutch 
offered organisational support, but the Indonesians denied them any involvement in 
PMR. The Indonesians promised supplies totalling 22,000 tons of rice between mid-May 
and mid-July in exchange for 39,000 yards of textiles, for which the Dutch authorities 
supplied 75 trucks and 2,000 tons of coal to enable transport of these rice supplies by 
road and rail. In fact, deliveries did not exceed 200 tons per day.146 
 As part of the Dutch agreement to the supply of rice to India, the Republican 
authorities agreed to regular deliveries of rice to the Dutch controlled areas, equal to the 
amount delivered to India.147 In total only 537 tons actually arrived in the areas under 
Allied control under this agreement.148 Lt.Governor General H.J. van Mook complained 
to the British authorities about the unreliability of the Republican promises. He even 
suggested that a limited military action in order to bring the rice fields in Kerawang West 
of Jakarta under Allied control, which would largely solve the problem of rice supply to 
Jakarta.149 The British government chose not respond to this suggestion, most likely 
because it did not want to endanger the promised supply of rice to famine-struck India. 
 For the second half of 1946 the colonial government estimated total rice 
requirements at 138,000 tons, of which it expected to import 30,000 from South Sulawesi 
and Lombok and to receive some 18,000 tons unregistered import from areas under 
Republican control. This left 90,000 tons to be imported. But it received an allocation of 
only 50,000 tons from IEFC for the second half of 1946. IEFC argued that 58,000 tons 
could be supplied from areas under Republican control on the basis of the agreement 
discussed above to supply 22,000 tons during 2 months. New negotiations followed 
between Dutch and Republican representatives in September and October about the 
monthly supply 2,000 tons of rice, 3,000 tons of paddy, 2,000 tons of maize, 500 tons of 
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soybeans and green beans and 500 tons of tapioca.150 They led to a Republican promise 
to supply 22,000 tons of rice agreement after 1 November 1946. Only 40 tons of rice, 300 
tons of paddy and 50 tons of stalk paddy were actually delivered during November and 
nothing since. There were several reminders and new requests. There were some 
promises by Republican authorities, but there are no indications that significant food 
supplies were delivered regularly. 
 Republican spokesmen stated that officially that the supplies were available, but 
that they could not be delivered, because of transport difficulties. Unofficially, 
Republican officials assured that the population was unwilling to supply rice for shipment 
to areas under Dutch control. They said that only after a political solution had been 
settled, a supply of up to 20,000 tons of rice per month would be possible in exchange for 
textiles. On the basis of such statements colonial officials concluded that PMR was 
simply not up to the task of raising enough supplies and delivering it via BUMA to the 
people of Jakarta.151 They considered it unlikely that PMR would be able to raise the 
requested amounts.  
 Given the situation in the rural areas described above, this is very likely. Another 
explanation for the fact that less than the agreed quantities were delivered is that the 
irregular and regular Republican armed forces arbitrarily obstructed food transports to 
areas under Dutch control.152 They either delayed the transports and levied tolls in kind 
for own consumption, or they requisitioned trucks supplied by the Allied forces for the 
transport of rice to the areas under Allied control. The problem was that there was little 
uniform action on the side of the Republic. In some places the armed forces even revived 
regulations from the Japanese period, which forbade people to carry more than five litres 
of rice per person.  
 In the meantime the food situation in cities such as Jakarta, Surabaya, Semarang 
and Bandung deteriorated rapidly due to the inflow of large numbers of refugees. Many 
people fled from the unsafe rural areas to the cities.153 On 9 October 1946 the distributed 
amounts in the cities under Dutch control were fixed at 200 grams per person per day, 
and 100 grams for richer people, depending on the supply VMF managed to organise. In 
practical terms this meant a supply of 150 to 160 grams per capita for the numbers of 
people shown in Table 6.154 Other people and other areas depended largely on the 
unregistered trade of rice from the area under Republican control.  
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Table 6: Rice Distribution in the Area under Dutch Control, December 1946 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
 Number of People Percentage of 
 in Distribution Population 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Jakarta 422,000  45% 
Surabaya 217,000 100% 
Bandung/Cianjur 157,000  25% 
Semarang 109,000  75% 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Source: ‘Rapport betreffende den Voedingstoestand van de Indonesische Bevolking in 
het Bezette Deel van Java’, S.G. Nooteboom to H.J. van Mook (7 February 1947) AS-
AN, No.845. 
 
 
 When the British had formally almost left the areas under Dutch control at the end 
of November 1946 and the Dutch were about to land their ‘7 December Division’, the 
Republican government sanctioned a complete economic boycott of the areas under 
Dutch control. Smuggling rice across the dividing lines into territory controlled by the 
Dutch became very remunerative, because only in the Dutch areas were the scarce 
imported commodities available. But the smuggled amounts can only have been small, 
because smuggling had to be done with carts and bicycles. The cities under Dutch control 
needed supplies which would have had to be transported in bulk.  
 A food production drive in South Sulawesi, Sumbawa, Bali and Lombok failed to 
render immediate success, because of crop failures due to drought during the 1946 dry 
season. The crop failures added to the shortages in the urban areas in Java and Sumatra. 
The colonial government appealed to the IEFC to increase the rice allocation to 90,000 
tons, when it appeared that the supply of rice to India was a void promise, but the 
allocations were not changed. 
 Consequently, the food situation in the areas under Dutch control started to 
deteriorate during November 1946. In January 1947 the situation was especially bad in 
Surabaya, where hardly any food seeped through from Republican territory. The average 
diet in Surabaya was estimated to be only 600 Kcal per person.155 The population 
suffered from a lack of proteins and the resistance of the population to diseases like 
malaria, tuberculosis and dysentery, diseases which had been banned in the pre-war years, 
declined. The mortality rate increased to an estimated 3% to 6% per month. In Semarang 
the average diet amounted to 900 Kcal. Malaria was becoming a serious problem, 
because the sanitation system did not function. The death rate was estimated to be about 
                     
155.  ‘Rapport betreffende den Voedingstoestand van de Indonesische Bevolking in het Bezette 
Deel van Java’, S.G. Nooteboom to H.J. van Mook (7 February 1947) AS-AN, No.845. 
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5.2% per month among the 150,000 inhabitants. In Jakarta the food situation in the 
outskirts of the city was reasonable, but the population in the kampungs in the other parts 
of the city suffered from malnutrition and lack of resistance against diseases. In Bandung 
and Bogor only a small part of the population was malnourished, because enough food 
trickled through from Republican territory. 
 In an attempt to prepare for a budding emergency situation in the beginning of 
1947, VMF was made the single-buyer of milled rice in September 1946, in order to 
prevent that the army, navy, local governments and factories and estates would start 
purchasing rice themselves and pushing up the price of rice. VMF organised the rice 
trade together with Chinese trading companies, which controlled about 90% of the trade 
in domestic rice at that moment. The main company with which VMF went into business 
was the Tjiong Pek Som Kongsi.156 VMF supplied the company with working capital and 
guaranteed it 10% of the purchase price as profit, of which 5% would be paid in cash and 
5% in coupons for textiles, which soon vanished on the black market. The main part of 
the domestic rice was purchased in East Indonesia, but the bulk of the VMF stocks was 
obtained from imports. Rice imports were monopolised by VMF, which appointed the 
Indo-Chinese Handel-Maatschappij Kian Goan (part of the Oei Tjong Ham concern) as 
sole import agency. The quality of the rice, the country of origin and the shipment 
schedule were fixed by VMF, after which Kian Goan contacted exporters and organised 
transport and imports.157  
 VMF attempted to safeguard food supply and prevent black market racketeering in 
the areas under Dutch control by distributing food. But in the beginning the main part of 
its purchase was used for distribution to the civil service, army, navy and police and to 
private enterprise. The major oil companies, estates and factories had to apply for rice 
allocations for supply to their labourers at the Bureau for Commodity Supplies (Bureau 
Goederenvoorziening) of the Department of Economic Affairs. Until August 1947 
registration of inter-island shipments of food with VMF were compulsory. Soon after 
private traders were again allowed to operate on their own accounts, taking responsibility 
of the trade and supply of home-pounded and milled rice.  
 For November and December 1946 the colonial authorities had estimated the 
required quantity of rice to be 20,000 tons. Only respectively 7,000 and 15,000 tons were 
actually imported. The colonial officials continued to claim 20,000 tons per month.158 But 
the IEFC allocations were still lower, although they were raised to 17,000 tons for the 
months January, February and March 1947. Still, the imports in January were only 
10,000 tons, and during the first half of February only 3,800 tons. The situation was 
complicated by the fact that the colonial government imposed a naval blockade on the 
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Republic in January 1947, in an attempt to get hold of stocks of estate products and food 
products, which were smuggled to Singapore. The blockade was answered by the 
Republican government with a food blockade, which was only a formalisation of the 
situation which in practice already existed.  
 The anxiety about the food situation in the areas under Dutch control increased late 
February 1947, because it was still three months until the main harvest, which would start 
mid-April in West Java and mid-May in East Java. It could be expected that less food 
would seep through the demarcation lines. The reserve stocks were minimal in the area 
under Dutch control and the colonial government believed that there were hardly any 
stocks in Republican territory.  
 Still, talks about cooperation and the way to independence were resumed and 
during the talks preceding the signing of the treaty of Linggarjati in May 1947, the 
Republican representatives proposed a Joint Food Committee (Gemeenschappelijke 
Voedingscommissie) with five Republican and five Dutch representatives. It was to 
coordinate the shipments of food from surplus to deficit areas and would recommend 
prices to separate other organisations, which would carry out the actual purchase and 
distribution.159 But the Dutch refused to accept. They wanted more power for this central 
body, instead of just coordination without any obligations. They also wanted the joint 
committee to decide with unanimous votes, instead of just a majority, on issues 
concerning prices and distribution. Because of their refusal, the Dutch remained deprived 
of the so badly needed food shipments from Republican territory.  
 In June 1947 the Dutch argued that the IEFC would be unaware of the Republican 
food blockade and would consider Java soon to be self-sufficient in rice again now that 
the treaty of Linggarjati had been signed. They feared that the IEFC would cut the 
requested quantities of rice for the second half of 1947. The colonial authorities estimated 
that they needed 131,000 tons of rice for distribution during the months July 1947-May 
1948. They expected to purchase 15,000 domestically and 40,000 abroad, which left a 
deficit of 76,000 tons.  
 At that time reports came through about deteriorating food situations in many parts 
of Java, especially Madura and the surroundings of Jakarta, Bogor and Surabaya, but also 
in Medan.160 Intelligence operations indicated that there were substantial stocks of rice in 
the Republican harbours of Probolinggo and Banyuwangi in East Java. A large part of 
this rice was still earmarked for India, but the colonial authorities argued that the main 
harvest had just been gathered in India, which meant that the need for rice was 
temporarily relieved in India. Hence, shipments could be delayed. The Republican food 
blockade, the bleak prospects for food supply in the areas under colonial control and the 
                     
159.  Yong (1982) pp.121-122. 
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possibility of capturing stocks of rice in the territory under Republican control 
contributed significantly to the decision of the Dutch government to start the first military 
action at the end of July 1947. The action aimed especially at the granaries West of 
Jakarta and in East Java. 
 The Dutch action was successful from a military point of view, but the Republican 
forces employed the scorched earth method strategy during their retreat. 40% Of the rice 
mills and their rice stocks went up in flames. From the captured administrations, it 
appeared that under Republican rule the production of paddy for several reasons had been 
much lower than expected.161 The rice mills had hardly worked and most of the surplus 
production of paddy appeared to have been hand-pounded. The captured visible stocks at 
the mills amounted to only 2,500 tons in West Java and 40,000 tons in East Java. The 
invisible stocks of hand-pounded rice were estimated to be 80,000 tons in West Java and 
60,000 tons in East Java.162 But the colonial authorities considered it to be difficult for 
VMF to get hold of hand-pounded paddy for distribution. Supplies had to reach urban 
areas through the free market.  
 
The Areas under Republican Control, 1947-1948 
 
Colonial officials took the defective way in which the Republican authorities had handled 
their commitment to India as evidence that the food situation in the areas under 
Republican control was not as good as the Indonesians made it appear. The problems of 
the Republican municipal government in Jakarta seemed to confirm this also. But in 
March 1947 the supply to the city improved considerably. Each day 30 tons of rice 
arrived, of which 20 tons was used for civil servants and Indonesians working for the 
Republican authorities. They received one kilogram of rice per day at Rp1.10/kg. 
Another 15 tons were used for distribution, which was insufficient for the registered 
770,000 inhabitants, who received 200 grams of rice twice a month for Rp2.50 per litre. 
The remaining five tons was supplied to institutions, such as hospitals.163  
 During talks about economic cooperation between the Republic and the colonial 
government in May 1947 the Indonesians assured the Director of Economic Affairs of the 
colonial government that the food situation in Republican territory was good, although 
                     
161.  The reasons are similar to the impediments during 1944-1946: (1) dry weather of 1946; (2) 
free play of rats, boars, birds etc. due to the shortage of labour; (3) shortage of good paddy seeds; 
(4) shortage of cattle for proper soil preparation; (5) state of disrepair of irrigation works; (6) 
shortage of means of transport. ‘Officieel Economisch Overzicht der Repoeblik nopens Oost-Java’ 
and ‘Officieel Economisch Overzicht der Repoeblik nopens Midden-Java’ (November 1947) AS-
ARA, No.2569 
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they did not produce any figures or elaborated analysis of the situation.164 From his own 
observations in Yogyakarta the director had to agree.165 But he could not believe that the 
food situation in the entire area was adequate, because of the poor state of the transport 
facilities. These were certainly insufficient to transport the one million tons of rice 
required to guarantee food supply everywhere in Java, like during the pre-war years. 
 An indication for the assumption that the supply of rice in the Republic was not as 
well as the authorities claimed, was that fact that in January 1947 PMR was transformed 
from a semi-private organisation into an agency of the new Ministry of Agriculture and 
Supply. It was expected that closer supervision of the central government would improve 
matters. The routine expenses of PMR were paid for by public means. Purchases were 
still financed with credits from BRI through the district heads, who paid farmers for 
delivering rice to the mills controlled by PMR. 
 There are no quantitative data available about the activities of PMR, but it is likely 
that its activities were not successful, because already in February 1947 the Republican 
government decided to intensify the control over food supply through the establishment 
of a special State Minister for Food Affairs, who took charge of PMR. PMR changed its 
name to Agency for the Supply and Distribution of Food Stuffs (Jawatan Persediaan dan 
Pembagian Bahan Makanan, PPBM), which started its work in March 1947. Its tasks 
were:166 
 
• supply of food stuffs, especially rice, to storehouses designated by the Republican 
government; 
• distribution of rice to the general public; 
• rice exports, which meant that PPBM took over the task of purchasing rice for India 
from the Panitia Beras India. 
 
PPBM had offices in Cirebon, Magelang and Malang, from where its officials set up a 
network which was supposed to reach into the village level.  
 The main difference between PMR and PPBM was that the new organisation did 
not work through the pangreh praja. But it is unlikely that the administrative change 
made much difference. The real value of PPBM’s purchase prices continued to be eroded 
by inflation. Purchased rice failed to reach the designated destiny, because of 
incompetence and emulation of the involved authorities. Local government officials 
obstructed shipments because they wanted to fulfil regional needs first, before allowing 
rice to be shipped elsewhere. 
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 After the first military action in July 1947, it appeared from captured administration 
that the distribution system had hardly worked due to inefficiency, bureaucratic red tape, 
emulation and deficient transport facilities.167 During June 1947 only 20% of the rice 
mills seemed to have worked, which may be indicative of the control by PPBM on food 
supplies.168 At the receiving end it is likely that the PPBM distribution policies were 
deficient. Supplies in the capital Yogyakarta may have been sufficient, but after the first 
Dutch military action in July 1947 Dutch military forces encountered appalling scenes of 
famine in areas such as Mojokerto and Madura.169  
 The Dutch military action had a considerable impact on the food situation. Now the 
Dutch controlled the pre-war surplus areas in North and East Java, and the Republican 
government controlled areas in Central and the far end of West Java. Several of the 
densely populated areas of Central Java were dependent on rice shipments. Food supply 
in Central Java indeed seems to have deteriorated in the course of 1948, because of the 
flow of refugees into Surakarta and the because of the increased pressure of the laskar 
rakyat to obtain food.  
 The situation in Republican territory became especially urgent after June 1948. 
Food prices increased rapidly in July 1948. In part this was a consequence of the fact that 
the measures of the Republican authorities had discouraged farmers from producing a 
rice surplus. During the 1948 main harvest farmers had been obliged to hand over about 
30% of their paddy harvest against fixed but rapidly depreciating prices.170 Although the 
Dutch negotiators about economic cooperation between the Republic and the colonial 
government opposed the idea of imposing fixed quota on farmers, the Republican 
authorities had no choice but to use this procedure, because of the Republican policy of 
monetary financing of the budget deficit. They suggested that purchasing rice against 
fixed prices was supposed to be a way of controlling the price of rice and of controlling 
inflation.  
 The other reason for the deteriorating food supply in the Republic was that a very 
dry monsoon during the second half of 1948 prevented a good dry season harvest. 
Moreover, the tilling of the land and the planting of paddy for the wet monsoon had to be 
postponed in most areas for at least a month. In July 1948 the colonial authorities already 
received reports about emergency situations in Asahan and Batur in North Sumatra, in the 
Northern part of Wonosobo, parts of Bojonegoro and Blora, and especially in Wonogiri, 
Ponorogo and Tulungagung in East Java. The colonial government twice offered rice and 
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textiles to the Republican government, which were finally accepted in November 1948 
for North Sumatra only.171  
 Prices continued a steep ascent in the areas under Republican control, both because 
of the shortage of food supplies, and because of the policy of monetary financing of the 
Republican government, Consequently, the real salaries of Republican civil servants 
declined. Several corrupted themselves and even joined the laskar rakyat in extorting rice 
from farmers, which were then smuggled to the territories under Dutch control.172 The 
Republican government tried to prevent hoarding of rice. On 3 September 1948 it issued 
a regulation which prescribed maximum quantities of paddy, rice, rice flour, maize and 
other food items which people were allowed to store for their own consumption. Larger 
quantities had to be registered with the PMR and had to be licensed.173 The government 
also repeated the ban on exports of food and cattle to the areas under Dutch control. The 
regular Republican army was ordered to control transports of goods into the areas under 
Dutch authority. On 1 November 1948 the Republican government issued a regulation 
which prescribed maximum prices for rice, maize, tapioca, peanuts, sugar, salt and 
clothing. The maximum prices were determined for each individual region, because the 
supply of goods and the supply of money in each region differed widely.174  
 There are indications of considerable hardship in several areas under Republican 
control, especially the urban areas including Yogyakarta at the end of 1948.175 But 
Republican officials denied that food supplies in general were deficient. Their expla-
nation for the hardship in several regions was that hoarding and smuggling of supplies to 
the areas under Dutch control caused shortages and increasing prices.  
 The situation in the Republic came to an end late December 1948, when the Dutch 
army launched a second major military assault on the Republic and managed to bring 
most of the remaining Republican territory under nominal colonial control. Republican 
guerrilla warfare continued, and with it the requisitioning of food supplies by the 
Republican forces in rural areas.176 Although the Dutch were obliged to restore the 
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Republic of Indonesia after international negotiations in May 1949, it seems likely that 
the military success of the Dutch government enhanced security and furthered a 
normalisation of economic life in Java, which may have contributed to an increase in 
food supplies during 1949. 
 
Recovery, 1947-1950 
 
After first Dutch military action in July 1947, the colonial authorities introduced several 
official services in the areas brought under Dutch control. VMF extended its work to 
these areas. It purchased paddy and rice where possible, with variable purchase prices. 
The LVD also resumed its work in the countryside in order to further rice production. It 
distributed that year 6,000 tons of fertiliser and 8 tons of seeds.  
 The main problem in organising food purchase and distribution was the milling 
capacity. During the occupation the Japanese had dismantled 66 mills and in August 1945 
157 mills with a capacity of 315,000 tons per year had been ready for milling. The reha-
bilitation of the other mills had been difficult, due to the lack of spare parts. Many were 
destroyed by Republican forces during the Dutch advance, especially in Kerawang and 
Indramayu. During the action the Dutch troops captured 380 mills, and the situation by 
November 1947 is shown in Table 7. The mills were often in a deplorable condition. 
Many required repairs, but spare parts were not available. VMF intended to work through 
the rice mills. But because of the poor condition of many mills, it was not possible to 
organise rice purchases immediately.  
 
 
Table 7: Situation of Rice Mills in Areas under Dutch Control, November 1947 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
 Total Destroyed     Destroyed  Unknown In  
 Number Before Mili- During and After Situation Working 
 of Mills tary Action    Military Action  Order 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
West Java 238 38 102 33  65 
Central Java  80  9  29 18  24 
East Java 126 12  46 38  30 
Total 444 59 177 89 119 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Source: ‘Economische Toestand’ (1947/48) p.20. 
 
 
 The colonial authorities established a rice distribution system in the areas brought 
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under its control, which existed next to PPMB. PPMB was allowed to continue its work, 
if necessary under supervision of VMF. But its impact was reported to have been 
marginal. Hence, the military action brought no immediate relief in the food situation in 
the areas under colonial control. In August the colonial government officially postponed 
all rice exports. This regulation was implicitly meant to prevent shipments of token 
quantities of rice from the Republic to India, with which the Republic may have wanted 
to gain international goodwill and prove that it was still in control. In September all 
exports of rice, maize and soybeans were forbidden, and rice stocks of over 5,000 tons 
had to registered with VMF. In November 1947 VMF started to purchase dry season rice 
in East Java, especially in Jember and Banyuwangi. Its purchase prices were not fixed, 
but adapted to current local price levels.177 Getting hold of rice supplies was considered 
more important than maintaining a price level.178 In contrast to the Republican 
government, the colonial government did not impose price regulations, because it could 
never have established an effective control system. It only controlled the prices of most 
imported and industrially manufactured products.  
 During the months August-December 1947 VMF purchased 60,010 tons of rice, 
which was less than expected.179 During 1947 a total of about 50,000 tons of maize and 
20,000 tons of paddy was shipped from Sulawesi to the areas under Dutch control in 
Sumatra and Java. That year about 116,644 tons of rice were imported by the colonial 
government. All together this may have been just enough for distribution in 1947, but it 
seemed insufficient for the lean season up to the 1948 main harvest. 
 The colonial government had requested 225,000 tons from the IEFC for the first 
half of 1948, but it received an allocation of only 140,000 tons.180 But there was some 
reason for optimism, because in March it became clear that the main harvest of 1948 
would be better than that of 1947. There were also even some transports of rice from 
Dutch controlled territory into Republican territory, under the condition that the 
Republican authorities would allow Indonesians to work in the areas under Dutch control, 
where they were paid in kind with textiles and rice. This happened especially in East 
Java.  
 In spite of these encouraging signs, there was no end to human suffering. In 1946 
the re-established colonial Nutrition Research Institute (Instituut voor Volksvoeding) had 
carried out a range of surveys among groups at risk, such as school children, in the areas 
controlled by the colonial government.181 At the end of 1948 it had to conclude that mal-
                     
177.  A Luytjes to H.J. van Mook (22 October 1947) AS-AN No.845. 
178.  E.g. in January 1948 the VMF purchase prices were ƒ35.-/100 kg. rice and ƒ17.-/100 kg. 
stalk paddy. But real prices varied very much, because purchase occurred partially with the supply 
of inducement goods, such as textiles.  
179.  Various notes, AS-AN, No.845. 
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nutrition was still widespread in many rural areas, especially among groups of poor 
tramps and beggars who arrived at rehabilitation camps from the areas under Republican 
control. Cases of malnutrition continued to be registered in many areas in Java well into 
1949.  
 In order to improve the system of rice purchase, VMF negotiated an agreement with 
the re-established associations of rice mills in the areas under colonial control in Java in 
April 1948. The mills were free to join these associations, although they were obliged to 
sell their produce to VMF via the associations. The mills which joined the associations 
agreed to work for VMF only and not to trade paddy or rice on their own account.182 
Hence, their purchase of paddy would be regulated and financed entirely by VMF. Rice 
mills would purchase paddy with VMF money, mill it at the order of VMF and deliver 
the rice at the request of VMF. This put VMF in a position with more control than it had 
before the Japanese occupation. Rather than working through the market, VMF now 
sought to control rice milling and the marketing of milled rice. But the system did not 
resemble the Japanese and Republican systems. Rice mills were still free to join. They 
could purchase paddy and mill rice on their own account although they had to supply 
their produce to VMF. The Japanese and Republican systems aimed at controlling all rice 
supplies and operated through the different layers of the civil service, which had to see to 
it that purchase targets were met. VMF did not operate along such lines. 
 Until August 1948 74 mills were reconstructed with the help of VMF, with a 
capacity of 148,000 tons. Another 19 were destroyed by guerrilla attacks. Three new 
mills were built in Tanggerang, Bekasi and Bandung. That meant that by August 1948 
177 were operating in the areas of Java under the control of the colonial government. 
Most rice mills cooperated with VMF. The whole purchase plan was to cover 600,000 
tons of rice between 1 April 1948 and 31 March 1949.183 
 In 1948 about 55% of the land with irrigated rice was harvested in areas controlled 
by the colonial government.184 Hence, the food situation in the colonial area was expected 
to improve considerably with the access of VMF to the rural areas. But the purchase 
system was not as effective as planned. Actual purchases during April-June 1948 
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182.  Economisch Weekblad (1948) p.350. 
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  1942 1946 
 West Java 78.1 97.6 
 Central Java 35.5 51.7 
 East Java 29.3 39.3 
 Total Java 48.5 65.3 
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amounted to 245,000 tons of rice. The main problem was that the free market price of 
rice in Java increased rapidly at the end of 1948, as Figure 6 shows. The VMF purchase 
price was often simply too low. The hike in rice prices was partly caused by the reaction 
of private traders hoarding large quantities of rice in reaction to rumours about a 
monetary purge. They used commodity stocks for speculation or for smuggling abroad, 
where prices were much higher than inside Indonesia. There were several additional 
problems. For instance, the attacks by Republican groups against rice mills working for 
the colonial VMF. Reprisals of Republicans against Indonesian people who accepted 
colonial currency made farmers reluctant to sell rice. Many transports were still unsafe. 
 
 
Figure 6: Urban Rice Prices, 1948-1950 (Guilders per 10 Litres) 
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Note: The prices are calculated as arithmetic averages, for Java from Jakarta, Bandung, 
Semarang and Surabaya, for the deficit areas in the Other Islands from Medan, 
Pangkalpinang and Pontianak, and for the surplus areas in the Other Islands from Ujung 
Pandang and Den Pasar. 
Sources: Economisch Weekblad; Ichtisar Bulanan Statistik.  
 
 
 During the second half of 1948 a very dry monsoon prevented a good dry season 
harvest. Especially the area under Republican control suffered the effects. The Republi-
can areas seemed to absorb food supplies from the areas under colonial control in Central 
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Java, putting additional pressure on prices.185 Moreover, the tilling of the land and the 
planting of paddy for the 1948/49 wet monsoon had to be postponed in most areas for at 
least a month. Total rice imports during 1948 amounted to 139,865 tons, only slightly 
higher than they had been in 1947. Anticipating a prolonged lean season in 1949, the 
colonial government implemented the Rice Ordinance (Rijstordonnantie) on 7 October 
1948.186 The ordinance had to prevent the creation of rice stocks by speculators. It 
prohibited the possession and transport of rice stocks larger than 1,000 kg. (or stocks of 
stalk paddy larger than 2,000 kg.) between 1 October 1948 and 1 April 1949, unless the 
stocks were registered with VMF and approved by VMF.187 The controls were most 
likely not completely effective, but they did contribute to a re-distribution of available 
supplies from surplus to deficit areas. 
 The allocation of the IEFC for the first half of 1949 was sufficient. The IEFC even 
maintained an allotment for the Republic of 20,000 tons, although the new government in 
Indonesia, the Provisional Federal Government (Voorlopige Federale Regering, VFR), 
did not want the Republic to import this amount.188 Imports by the Republic would imply 
an oversupply of rice in the Republic compared to the rest of Indonesia, while the bill 
would go to VFR, because the Republic had no foreign exchange. On the other hand, the 
Republic wanted to receive the allocated rice, in order to strengthen its foreign exchange 
situation through barter trade.  
 After the second military action late December 1948 it became much easier for 
VMF to control rice milling and marketing market in Indonesia. During the entire 
1948/49 season VMF purchased the following quantities of rice:189 
 
Domestic, Java 235,400 
 Other Islands    38,200 
 Sub-Total 273,600 
Abroad  237,400 
Carry-over of Old Stock    12,000 
Total Supply 523,000 
 
VMF estimated that it required about 42,000 tons per month for Java and 17,500 tons for 
the Other Islands until April. In January and February it used 106,286 tons of a stock of 
206,825 tons, and it expected that the remaining 100,000 tons would be sufficient for the 
months March and April. But bad weather delayed the harvest, which meant a prolonged 
                     
185.  P.H. Angenent, ‘Politiek Verslag van Midden Java [...] over de Maand Sep. 1948’ (4 
November 1948) OBNIB Vol.14, p.277; Idem, ‘Politiek Verslag Midden Java [...] over Okt. 1948’ 
(7 December 1948) OBNIB Vol.14, pp.553-554. 
186.  Staatsblad (1948) No.253. 
187.  Economisch Weekblad (1948) pp.199-203. 
188.  J. Mertens to H.A. Lovink (2 August 1949) AS-AN No.841. 
189.  Calculated from several notes, OA No.4423. 
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lean season. The situation could not be relieved with imports, because further deliveries 
under the Marshall Aid scheme had been halted after the second Dutch military action.  
 In spite of these negative points, the food situation was not really alarming and was 
considered to be much better than in previous years.190 After September 1949 the Rice 
Ordinance came in force again in order to help overcome the period until the main 
harvest in 1950, but the food situation was less urgent than it had been before. The main 
rice harvest in 1950 was not as good as 1949, but rice imports of 334,374 tons, or about 
5% of total rice supply in Indonesia, prevented a drastic fall in food supply. 
 Despite recovering national and international rice production, the government of the 
Federated Republic of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat, RIS) chose to continue 
VMF after 1949. The authorities argued that the free market would not be able to 
function to the extent that the demand dor food in all regions would be met. The transport 
system was still in disrepair in many areas. But the government had new arguments for 
continuing VMF. One was that control over rice supply helped to guarantee price 
stability, because rice determined the overall price level to a considerable extent. In 
addition, part of the rice stock was by then distributed to what were called ‘essential 
services and institutions’, such as foreign exchange earning plantations and mining 
companies. Another increasing part of the rice stock were used as payment in kind of the 
salaries of civil servants and the armed forces.  
 With the formation of the unitary Indonesian Republic on 17 August 1950 VMF 
and PPBM of the Republic of Indonesia in Yogyakarta were amalgamated into the 
Foundation for Food Stuffs (Yayasan Bahan Makanan, BAMA), a division of the 
Department of Agriculture. The tasks of BAMA and its successors were later expanded. 
The government rice purchase programs soon became a controversial issue, because the 
food logistics agencies had to take a range of measures and enforce an increasing grip on 
the domestic rice economy in order to meet the set purchase targets.191 Next to 
accelerated population growth during the 1950s and 1960s, this increasing hold on the 
rice economy is another explanation for the fact that per capita calorie supply in 
Indonesia did not recover to pre-war levels until the 1970s.192 Especially when the rate of 
inflation accelerated at the end of the 1950s purchase prices became very unattractive to 
farmers. VMF had been a semi-private institution, but with the establishment of BAMA, 
public officials down to the village level had again become responsible for the purchase 
of rice in their areas. The system was therefore similar to that during the Japanese 
                     
190.  ‘Rijstpositie in Indonesië Januari 1949’ (17 January 1949) AS-AN No.846. See also various 
regional reports comparing the 1949 situation with 1948: AS-ARA No.3433. 
191.  Heemstra (1952/53); Sadli (1961); Mears (1961). On the basis of experience with 
intervention in the rice market during 1950s and 1951, Heemstra (1952/53, p.47) called further 
market intervention a ‘dangerous experiment’, because too low purchase prices immobilised the 
rice surplus and enhanced the import of rice.  
192.  Van der Eng (1993) p.14. 
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occupation and in the Republic of Indonesia. The officials again came under increasing 
pressure to realise the quota imposed on their areas. Hence, several of them appear to 
have resorted to ways of persuading farmers to deliver rice akin to those used during the 
1940s. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper provides an overview of food production, supply policies and actual supply in 
order to understand changes in a significant part of the Indonesian economy during 1940-
1950. It did not pretend to be complete and unequivocal. In fact, the paper establishes 
gaps in the general knowledge about food supply during this hectic period in Indonesia’s 
history. Due to the fragmentation of the Indonesian economy during the 1940s it is 
necessary that further studies will be conducted into the economic circumstances in 
particular areas during these years. Another blank in the available data is the organisation 
of rice purchase and distribution in the areas under control of the Republic of Indonesia 
during 1945-1948. There are ample opportunities for further research. Many sources in 
the archives mentioned among the references below have not been studied yet, and there 
are other archives waiting to be explored. 
 Despite the deficiencies, the paper has indicated that the involvement of the 
authorities with rice supply has been a continuous process since the 1930s. The colonial 
government inaugurated food policies for pragmatic reasons. The Japanese authorities 
turned it into a far more rigorous delivery system and added a rigid distribution system, 
which was aimed at replacing the free market entirely. The Indonesian Republic took this 
institutional framework over from the Japanese. The available evidence suggests that the 
political confusion and insecurity caused insufficient supervision and rampant logistical 
problems after the Japanese surrender. In reality local ad-hoc policies to meet the demand 
for rice replaced the in principle integrated delivery and distribution system. The 
returning colonial government re-established its own pre-war procedures and gradually 
obtained wider access to food surpluses for distribution. After the full independence in 
December 1949 the food purchase and distribution systems of the Republican and 
colonial governments were amalgamated. In 1950 Indonesia had a system of government 
control over food supply with roots in the colonial, the Japanese and the Republican 
experience.  
 The food situation became critical in Java, where the balance between food 
production and population growth had been delicate before World War II. There was 
endemic malnutrition, but no sign of prevalent famine. During the Japanese occupation 
the precarious balance was disturbed and food supply declined rapidly. External 
circumstances, such as the termination of foreign trade, the Japanese attempts to include 
Indonesia in the Japanese war economy, and the disruption caused by the Indonesian 
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revolution are in themselves insufficient arguments to untangle the demise of food 
production. Specific supply side problems also fail to explain the fall in production. The 
most important reasons for declining food supply in Java were found in the allocation 
mechanism on the demand side, in the form of the rigorous measures to control food 
production and food supply introduced by the Japanese authorities and continued by the 
government of the Republic of Indonesia.  
 In itself strict control over the food economy is not a sufficient explanation. Many 
other countries, including Asian countries such as India and Japan, introduced delivery 
and distribution systems for the most important food products.193 In most cases these 
systems contributed significantly to an even distribution of scarce supplies. However, 
there are two essential differences between these systems in these other countries and in 
Java. Firstly, on the distribution side they were based on elaborated population 
administrations. There was nothing of the kind in Indonesia. The Japanese authorities 
introduced a pyramid-shaped system of neighbourhood groups. But the system was not in 
place until 1944 and even then it excluded a large number of the landless and 
unemployed poor. Moreover, unlike Indonesia, in Western countries the percentage of 
the people in urban areas was much higher. These people depended on the distribution 
systems and had a vested interest in the efficient organisation of such systems.  
 Secondly, about 70% of the population in Java had direct access to food supplies, 
because they produced it themselves. In Western countries the share of people in 
agriculture was much lower and farm enterprise was more capital intensive. Hence, in 
order to maintain their standard of living and also meet the depreciation costs of their 
capital stocks, farmers in Western countries had virtually no choice but to largely comply 
with the delivery systems, despite the controlled prices they received for their products. In 
rural Java most farmers were not under any obligation to meet fixed costs. They therefore 
found it easier to cut back production when the official purchase prices depreciated 
rapidly. They produced enough to meet their own requirements and the official quota as 
far as absolutely necessary. On top of that they may have produced a surplus which was 
much smaller than before the Japanese occupation. Firstly, because a smaller quantity 
was easier to transport and hide from the authorities. Secondly, the real value of a smaller 
quantity may have been the same, or even more, than the real value of the pre-war 
surplus.  
 This interpretation of the delivery and distribution system allows two conclusions. 
Firstly, the non-agricultural people who had no direct access to food and who were not 
adequately serviced through the distribution system, must have suffered the consequences 
of declining food supplies. Secondly, lower supplies for distribution triggered more 
stringent control measures on trade. Transport facilities deteriorated rapidly as a result of 
neglect and the Japanese plunder of railway stocks and motorised road vehicles. Both 
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immobilised food supplies even further. 
 To a large extent these are also the reasons which impeded the recovery of food 
production during the years 1946-1950, albeit that some of the available supplies also 
failed to reach the deficit areas due to politically motivated obstruction during 1946-
1947. The Dutch military advance during 1947-1949 brought a delivery system to the 
rice producing areas that provided farmers some protection from the arbitrariness during 
previous years, and that guaranteed a more realistic compensation for the paddy 
deliveries. This and the gradual improvement of security and transport facilities explain 
the steady recovery of rice production.  
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Appendix 1: Food Production 
 
Geoogste Uitgestrektheden (1947) is used to estimate food crop production for Java 
during 1940-1946. For the years 1942-1946 this source contains official data collected 
during the Japanese occupation and during the rule of the Republic of Indonesia over 
Java. The system for estimating the production of the main food crops in Java was very 
meticulous. (Van der Eng, 1990, pp.32-33) Certainly compared with systems used in 
many other countries it was very accurate. The system of monthly reporting on planted 
and harvested areas and on average yields involved officials down to the village levels. 
There is no reason to assume that the system of reporting as such deteriorated after the 
Japanese occupation. Reporting and the processing of the reports was largely done by 
Indonesian officials who remained in function. It is possible to assume that especially 
village officials tampered with the results. There were not many possibilities for lowering 
the estimates of harvested area, because the system was such that statistical controllers 
could check the records with random rough estimates. Average yields were determined 
with regional crop cuttings on farmers’ fields. It is possible that these were manipulated. 
Farmers may have neglected fields designated for crop cuttings on their own initiative, or 
on the instruction of village officials. Local officials of the land tax service and the 
agricultural extension service may also knowingly have miscalculated the results of these 
crop cuttings.  It is unlikely that all data in Geoogste Uitgestrektheden (1947) have to be 
discarded. 1944 Was a very poor cropping year, which may explain the falls in both 
average yields and harvested area (planted area less ‘failed’ area, which is areas on which 
less than 10% of the planted crop was still standing) that year. But there is no reason to 
accept the extraordinary low yields of 1945 and 1946. For that reason this study uses the 
harvested areas and the average 1942/43 yields per residency to estimate crop production 
for 1945 and 1946. 
 There are several different estimates for the years 1947 and 1948. The main 
problem during these years was that the system for collecting the data was seriously 
disturbed due to the Dutch military advances and the guerrilla warfare. The most 
complete estimate for 1947 seems to be from Republican sources, which distinguishes 
between production in areas controlled by the Republic and by the Dutch. (Indonesia 
Information (London), 22 August 1948) Republican authorities were in a position to 
gather reports on the main season harvest and on the area planted with 1947 dry season 
crops, before the start of the first Dutch military action. The estimate for 1948 is from 
Dutch sources and is perhaps the most arbitrary one, because the Dutch authorities could 
only adequately measure production in the areas under colonial control. They had to rely 
on rough estimates of production in the areas under Republican control. The production 
data for 1949 and 1950 are most likely more adequate, because of the extension of 
colonial control throughout Java after December 1948 which unified the system used to 
estimate production.   
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Table A.1: Production of Food Crops in Java, 1940-1950        
  1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Production (1,000 tons)             
 Stalk Paddy 8,361  8,969  8,993  8,302  8,122  6,870  6,470  6,741  6,840  6,925  7,788  7,528 
 Maize 1,985  1,900  2,433  2,165  1,604  1,177  1,399  1,096  1,328  1,600  1,850  1,600 
 Cassava 8,311  8,415  8,736  8,735  7,521  5,263  4,623  5,249  5,776  6,067  7,070  5,760 
 Sweet Potatoes 1,268  1,418  1,475  1,312  1,084  1,486  2,288  1,486  1,294  1,140  1,170  942 
 Soybeans 318  294  338  352  273  108  102  180  188  256  250  245 
 Peanuts 181  197  210  206  211  108  78  111  134  165  190  171 
Harvested Area (1,000 
ha) 
            
 Paddy 4,028  4,089  4,101  4,026  4,132  3,572  3,203  3,349  3,568  3,600  3,644  3,640 
 Maize 2,030  1,983  2,229  2,214  1,812  1,399  1,488  1,150  1,614  2,002  2,224  1,800 
 Cassava 992  1,040  1,003  976  950  829  551  626  786  896  998  712 
 Sweet Potatoes 197  209  205  189  180  259  350  227  307  240  189  155 
 Soybeans 415  418  440  481  384  185  141  246  290  347  334  323 
 Peanuts 241  251  259  253  291  175  100  144  192  233  259  225 
 Total 7,903  7,991  8,237  8,138  7,749  6,419  5,833  5,742  6,758  7,317  7,648  6,855 
Yield (tons/hectare)             
 Stalk Paddy 2.08  2.19  2.19  2.06  1.97  1.92  2.02  2.01  1.92  1.92  2.14  2.07 
 Maize 0.98  0.96  1.09  0.98  0.88  0.84  0.94  0.95  0.82  0.80  0.83  0.89 
 Cassava 8.37  8.09  8.71  8.95  7.92  6.35  8.39  8.38  7.35  6.77  7.08  8.09 
 Sweet Potatoes 6.42  6.79  7.18  6.95  6.01  5.73  6.54  6.55  4.21  4.75  6.20  6.07 
 Soybeans 0.77  0.70  0.77  0.73  0.71  0.58  0.72  0.73  0.65  0.74  0.75  0.76 
 Peanuts 0.75  0.78  0.81  0.82  0.73  0.62  0.78  0.77  0.70  0.71  0.73  0.76 
Sources: (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (4) (4) (5) 
              
 (1)  Geoogste Uitgestrektheden (1947).         
 (2)  Idem, production estimated with corrected yield per residency.       
 (3)  Indonesian Information (London) (22 Augustus 1948).       
 (4)  Report Java Bank (1948/49) p.74.         
 (5)  Metcalf (1952) p.38.          
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Appendix 2: Population 
 
There are no official population data for the period 1940-1950. (Nitisastro, 1970) The 
last population census before the period was held in 1930, and the next one in 1961. The 
Central Bureau of Statistics organised a count on the basis of village population registers 
in 1955. (Mears, 1961, pp.176-182) There is no guarantee that the count was accurate. In 
fact, annual average growth rates calculated from these data and the results of the 1961 
census seem to be very high, suggesting that the results of the 1955 count were too low. 
For that reason this study uses the results of the 1930 and 1961 population censuses at 
residency level. 
 An interpolation of both benchmark years with birth and death rates is not possible, 
because a more or less accurate registration of births was not introduced in Java until 
1934 and published data are not available for all years. It is likely that population growth 
rates decreased during the years 1943-1946 and increased again during the years 1947-
1950. Evidence published by De Vries (1947) suggests that population growth was in fact 
negative in Java during the years 1944 and 1945. De Meel (1951) and Keyfitz (1953) 
suggest similar patterns. 
 For Java this study applies the following arbitrary procedure. It uses the absolute 
data on deaths and births per residency in 1939 from De Vries (1947). Net population 
increase per residency is related to the 1930 population data, in order to obtain a key with 
which to distribute the assumed growth for Java as a whole of 1.5% over all the 
residencies for the years 1931-1942. These growth rates are rounded, due to which the 
total growth rate becomes 1.45% for the years 1931-1942. The indicated average for 
1930-1940 is 1.43%, because the total is a compounded growth rate. 
 1943 And 1944 are estimated with the 1942 estimates and the absolute data on 
deaths and births from De Vries (1947). The growth rates for the years 1945-1949 are 
estimated by trial-and-error, trying to meet two conditions: 
• the growth rates for Java as a whole are to be around -1.0% in 1945, 0.0% in 1946, 
0.75% in 1947, 1.0% in 1948, 1.5% in 1949. (De Meel, 1951); 
• the population data for 1950 are obtained by interpolating the obtained population 
estimates for 1949 and the 1961 census data. Hence, the estimated growth rates for 
1949 had to be lower than the growth rate for 1950 (which equals the annual average 
growth rates for 1950-1961). The growth rates for residencies with the major cities in 
Java are assumed to have been higher after 1945 than before 1942, because of the 
growth of the major cities in Java. This concerns Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya. 
 An accurate correction for inter-residential, inter-island and international migration 
is impossible. The overall impact of international migration was most likely marginal, 
although many Europeans and several Indonesians may have managed to leave Indonesia 
before the surrender to the Japanese in 1942. Inter-regional migration was significant 
before the Japanese occupation. (Wander, 1965) It may have been significant throughout 
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the period under consideration. The most relevant movement may have been that of poor 
people from the deprived rural areas. It is likely that many of them migrated to the cities. 
That can be regarded as a major reason why the Jakarta growth rates are high. On the 
other hand, the growth rates for Madura are very low, which can be interpreted as the 
result of the continuous migration of people from Madura to East Java.  
 The study implicitly assumes that in 1943 and 1944 inter-regional movements did 
not occur. Hence, the growth rates for 1943 and 1944 range widely. It is possible to 
interpret the wide variation as follows. In a situation in which a free flow of people is 
possible, one would expect available food supplies to disperse via the market and 
population densities to adjust via migration in order to achieve a most optimum allocation 
of supplies. However, the available food surplus was not allocated through the free 
market after 1942, but through a distribution system. There may therefore have been no 
reason for deprived people to follow the distributed food surplus, apart perhaps from the 
most desperately deprived people. Moreover, in 1943 the Japanese authorities decreed 
that residencies had to aim at general economic self-sufficiency. Transports of goods, 
including black market food supplies, were restricted drastically. A consequence of these 
measures may have been that food supplies equalled out within the residencies, but at 
very different average supply levels. Poor food supplies in particular residencies may 
have affected the poor, which may have had a significant impact on the rates of net 
natural increase.  
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 Table A.2.1: Population per Residency, 1930-1961 (thousands)
1930 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1961
Banten 1,029 1,194 1,212 1,230 1,239 1,241 1,237 1,241 1,250 1,265 1,288 1,310 1,588
Jakarta 2,637 3,376 3,460 3,546 3,574 3,575 3,628 3,719 3,831 3,946 4,084 4,241 6,436
Bogor 2,213 2,568 2,607 2,646 2,664 2,659 2,653 2,666 2,693 2,726 2,767 2,816 3,413
Priangan 3,449 4,163 4,242 4,323 4,358 4,360 4,349 4,371 4,404 4,459 4,559 4,668 6,053
Cirebon 2,070 2,379 2,412 2,446 2,464 2,459 2,439 2,439 2,455 2,476 2,513 2,557 3,097
Pekalongan 2,640 2,916 2,945 2,975 3,009 2,972 2,940 2,940 2,954 2,974 2,996 3,028 3,401
Semarang 2,021 2,277 2,304 2,332 2,340 2,284 2,278 2,278 2,295 2,318 2,347 2,383 2,822
Pati 1,876 2,072 2,093 2,114 2,121 2,083 2,057 2,057 2,065 2,076 2,091 2,113 2,366
Bojonegoro 1,713 1,819 1,830 1,840 1,835 1,795 1,764 1,764 1,773 1,786 1,808 1,832 2,119
Banyumas 2,068 2,424 2,463 2,502 2,550 2,566 2,522 2,522 2,528 2,535 2,547 2,571 2,851
Kedu 2,536 2,733 2,753 2,774 2,810 2,796 2,748 2,748 2,755 2,769 2,783 2,801 3,009
Yogyakarta 1,559 1,809 1,836 1,864 1,892 1,888 1,857 1,867 1,881 1,895 1,916 1,941 2,241
Surakarta 2,565 3,021 3,071 3,122 3,156 3,124 3,080 3,080 3,096 3,127 3,166 3,225 3,958
Madiun 1,969 2,263 2,294 2,326 2,354 2,352 2,324 2,324 2,341 2,365 2,391 2,425 2,844
Surabaya 2,176 2,525 2,563 2,602 2,608 2,587 2,582 2,582 2,608 2,640 2,693 2,749 3,448
Kediri 2,411 2,868 2,918 2,969 3,018 3,015 2,963 2,963 2,985 3,015 3,060 3,114 3,770
Malang 2,741 3,150 3,194 3,239 3,249 3,233 3,213 3,229 3,254 3,278 3,324 3,375 3,991
Besuki 2,083 2,478 2,521 2,565 2,579 2,579 2,563 2,583 2,615 2,654 2,710 2,768 3,501
Madura 1,962 2,062 2,073 2,083 2,093 2,084 2,053 2,053 2,057 2,063 2,070 2,076 2,150
Total Java 41,718 48,097 48,792 49,498 49,915 49,652 49,251 49,425 49,839 50,365 51,111 51,995 63,058
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Table A.2.2: Estimated Annual Population Growth Rates per Residency, 1930-1961
1930-40 1940-41 1941-42 1942-43 1943-44 1944-45 1945-46 1946-47 1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-61 1930-61
Banten 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 0.68% 0.15% -0.25% 0.25% 0.75% 1.25% 1.75% 1.76% 1.76% 1.41%
Jakarta 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 0.79% 0.01% 1.50% 2.50% 3.00% 3.00% 3.50% 3.86% 3.86% 2.92%
Bogor 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 0.70% -0.19% -0.25% 0.50% 1.00% 1.25% 1.50% 1.76% 1.76% 1.41%
Priangan 1.90% 1.90% 1.90% 0.81% 0.05% -0.25% 0.50% 0.75% 1.25% 2.25% 2.39% 2.39% 1.83%
Cirebon 1.40% 1.40% 1.40% 0.76% -0.21% -0.80% 0.00% 0.65% 0.85% 1.50% 1.76% 1.76% 1.31%
Pekalongan 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.16% -1.23% -1.10% 0.00% 0.50% 0.65% 0.75% 1.06% 1.06% 0.82%
Semarang 1.20% 1.20% 1.20% 0.34% -2.38% -0.30% 0.00% 0.75% 1.00% 1.25% 1.55% 1.55% 1.08%
Pati 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 0.34% -1.79% -1.25% 0.00% 0.40% 0.50% 0.75% 1.03% 1.03% 0.75%
Bojonegoro 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% -0.29% -2.18% -1.75% 0.00% 0.50% 0.75% 1.25% 1.33% 1.33% 0.69%
Banyumas 1.60% 1.60% 1.60% 1.92% 0.61% -1.70% 0.00% 0.25% 0.25% 0.50% 0.94% 0.94% 1.04%
Kedu 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% -0.50% -1.70% 0.00% 0.25% 0.50% 0.50% 0.65% 0.65% 0.55%
Yogyakarta 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.48% -0.22% -1.60% 0.50% 0.75% 0.75% 1.10% 1.32% 1.32% 1.18%
Surakarta 1.65% 1.65% 1.65% 1.12% -1.02% -1.40% 0.00% 0.50% 1.00% 1.25% 1.88% 1.88% 1.41%
Madiun 1.40% 1.40% 1.40% 1.18% -0.09% -1.20% 0.00% 0.75% 1.00% 1.10% 1.46% 1.46% 1.19%
Surabaya 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 0.23% -0.80% -0.20% 0.00% 1.00% 1.25% 2.00% 2.08% 2.08% 1.50%
Kediri 1.75% 1.75% 1.75% 1.65% -0.08% -1.75% 0.00% 0.75% 1.00% 1.50% 1.75% 1.75% 1.45%
Malang 1.40% 1.40% 1.40% 0.33% -0.52% -0.60% 0.50% 0.75% 0.75% 1.40% 1.54% 1.54% 1.22%
Besuki 1.75% 1.75% 1.75% 0.54% 0.00% -0.60% 0.75% 1.25% 1.50% 2.10% 2.16% 2.16% 1.69%
Madura 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% -0.43% -1.50% 0.00% 0.20% 0.30% 0.30% 0.32% 0.32% 0.30%
Total Java 1.43% 1.45% 1.45% 0.84% -0.53% -0.81% 0.35% 0.84% 1.06% 1.48% 1.73% 1.77% 1.34%
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Appendix 3: Food Supply in Java 
 
Average food supplies are calculated as food balances, taking account of imports and 
exports and the use of crops for seed, feed and losses. No data are available on the carry-
over of stocks.  
 Population is from Table A.2.1. Food crop production is from Table A.1 for Java as 
a whole and from Geoogste Uitgestrektheden (1947) for the residencies in Table A.3.2, 
corrected for 1945 and 1946 with 1942/43 average yields. Foreign and inter-island trade 
is from Report Java Bank (various years) and 1942-1945 from Kishi and Nishijima 
(1963) passim. Rates of seed and feed use and losses are elaborated in Van der Eng 
(1990, pp.79-81). The following rates are deducted from gross production: 
 
 Seed  Feed Losses 
Irrigated Paddy 55 kg/ha 2%  7% 
Upland Paddy 52 kg/ha 2%  7% 
Maize 25 kg/ha 5%  5% 
Cassava  - 2% 13% 
Sweet Potatoes 9% of production 2% 10% 
Peanuts 80 kg/ha  -  5% 
Soybeans 50 kg/ha  -  5% 
 
 Table A.3.2 refers to the six main food crops only. Table A.3.1 includes the 
following products: meat, sugar, copra, palm oil, fish, poultry products and fruit and 
vegetables. 
 Slaughtered livestock is from Van der Eng (1990, p.68-71). For the calculation of 
meat supply the following rates have been used: 
 
 Carcass Weight Offal Share 
Buffaloes 156.4 kg. 25% 
Cows 160.0 kg. 25% 
Horses 125.0 kg. 20% 
Sheep and Goats  10.0 kg. 25% 
Pigs  55.0 kg. 10% 
 
 Per capita palm oil supply is calculated from available production and export data. 
(Van der Eng, 1990, p.49). The consumption of sugar and copra is assumed to have been 
roughly as follows (kg. per capita per year): 
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 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Palm Oil 0.9 0.0 1.7 1.1 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Sugar 10 8 8 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Copra 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
 
 The conversion factor 0.52 to convert stalk paddy into rice. For conversion into 
calories and protein I used the following conversion factors per kilogram from Daftar 
Komposisi (1967) and Neraca Bahan Makanan di Indonesia (1985): 
 
 Kcal Protein (grams) 
Rice 3,600  68 
Maize 3,610  87 
Cassava 1,460  12 
Sweet Potatoes 1,230  18 
Peanuts 4,520 253 
Soybeans 3,310 349 
Palm Oil 9,020   0 
Sugar 3,640   0 
Copra 3,590  34 
Buffalo Meat 2,070 188 
Beef   840 187 
Horse Meat 1,180 181 
Mutton and Goat Meat 1,700 168 
Pork 4,170 130 
 
 For 1940-1942 rough estimates of the following per capita daily consumption of 
fish, fruit and vegetables and poultry were added (Van der Eng, 1993, p.25): 
 
 Kcal Protein (grams) 
Fresh Fish 15 2.0 
Vegetables 35 2.0 
Fruits 20 0.5 
Poultry Products 40 2.0 
 
For 1943-1950 the supply of these three products is linked to the sub-total supply of Kcal 
and proteins from the products mentioned above. 
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Table A.3.1: Net Food Supply in Java, 1940-1950           
  1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Net Import/Export (1,000 tons)             
 Rice -abroad 21  -58  -109  40  20  10  -30  100  58  70  138  140 
      -inter island -188  -74  -100  -31  -8         
 Maize -59  -33  -25      0  0  -15  0  -38 
 Cassava -1402  -1131  -1733      -1  0  -3  -3  -89 
 Soybeans -5  -10  -10      0  0  0  0  0 
 Peanuts -66  -45  -40      0  0  -9  -12  -23 
              
Population (mln.) 47.4  48.1  48.8  49.5  49.9  49.6  49.2  49.4  49.8  50.3  51.1  51.9 
              
Total Supply Per Person Per 
Day: 
            
 Kcal., Total 2,071  2,162  2,187  2,267  1,979  1,582  1,553  1,565  1,630  1,705  1,904  1,678 
 Rice 769  824  798  766  742  632  593  641  636  639  722  687 
 Other Food Crops 979  997  1,069  1,155  939  688  727  690  755  817  923  747 
 Sugar, Copra, Palm Oil 202  220  198  219  185  171  148  148  148  154  154  150 
 Meat 11  11  11  14  13  12  8  7  9  9  9  9 
 Fish 15 15 15 16  14  11  11  11  11  12  13  12 
 Vegetables, Fruit, Poultry 95  95  95  98  86  69  67  68  71  74  83  73 
              
 Proteins (gr.), Total 43.2  44.1  46.5  46.8  40.7  30.4  30.2  31.3  32.9  35.7  39.4  35.3 
 Rice 14.5  15.6  15.1  14.5  14.0  11.9  11.2  12.1  12.0  12.1  13.6  13.0 
 Other Food Crops 20.2  20.0  22.9  23.5  18.8  12.1  13.1  13.2  14.5  16.8  18.4  15.6 
 Sugar, Copra, Palm Oil 0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9 
 Meat 1.1  1.0  1.1  1.4  1.2  1.1  0.8  0.7  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9 
 Fish 2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  1.7  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.7  1.5 
 Vegetables, Fruit, Poultry 4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5  3.9  2.9  2.9  3.0  3.2  3.5  3.8  3.4 
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Table A.3.2: Net Calorie Supply per Residency, 1940-1946
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
Banten 1,647 1,642 1,505 1,538 1,363 1,139 1,217 68.5% 68.0% 70.7% 73.3% 63.4% 63.3% 75.3%
Jakarta 1,327 1,409 1,349 1,175 991 896 1,148 82.8% 80.1% 76.7% 83.6% 83.4% 80.0% 77.2%
Bogor 1,436 1,341 1,413 1,295 1,007 973 976 70.2% 62.2% 63.5% 66.2% 64.5% 71.4% 74.0%
Priangan 1,626 1,565 1,416 1,408 1,161 1,288 1,263 52.8% 51.7% 55.1% 59.5% 54.9% 46.9% 51.4%
Cirebon 1,917 1,804 1,700 1,526 1,205 1,367 1,216 71.6% 72.8% 67.7% 69.0% 80.1% 73.0% 75.5%
West Java 1,569 1,532 1,455 1,360 1,115 1,131 1,168 67.5% 65.7% 65.6% 69.1% 68.4% 64.3% 67.8%
Pekalongan 1,758 1,920 1,824 1,498 1,049 1,024 1,132 47.7% 42.9% 41.3% 47.0% 56.7% 49.6% 52.0%
Semarang 2,373 2,624 2,344 2,015 1,997 1,869 1,592 36.5% 32.7% 28.8% 33.7% 30.9% 32.3% 36.7%
Pati 2,217 2,439 2,118 1,944 1,242 1,473 1,337 35.6% 35.2% 31.8% 33.8% 37.7% 38.4% 42.1%
Banyumas 2,440 2,668 2,295 2,059 1,478 1,577 1,449 46.9% 44.8% 49.1% 49.4% 45.1% 38.2% 45.7%
Kedu 2,375 2,705 2,468 2,017 1,568 1,690 1,511 38.9% 34.3% 35.9% 38.9% 40.4% 36.3% 34.5%
Principalities 1,944 2,036 2,093 1,720 1,298 1,621 1,450 33.7% 32.1% 28.9% 32.9% 36.0% 28.3% 31.7%
Central Java 2,128 2,323 2,163 1,833 1,405 1,534 1,407 39.1% 36.3% 34.8% 38.3% 39.8% 35.3% 38.8%
Madiun 1,839 1,980 1,868 1,560 835 975 1,295 29.1% 26.5% 28.7% 28.4% 50.9% 39.4% 34.7%
Bojonegoro 1,664 1,748 1,394 1,199 899 690 735 37.1% 37.1% 27.7% 35.5% 55.2% 41.0% 44.4%
Surabaya 1,493 1,561 1,430 1,465 1,231 1,053 1,027 55.0% 53.2% 46.5% 47.7% 56.0% 60.0% 54.4%
Kediri 2,093 2,370 2,172 1,748 1,167 1,224 1,399 31.5% 27.8% 29.1% 34.9% 44.6% 41.9% 38.4%
Malang 2,250 2,603 2,377 1,866 1,405 1,237 1,227 35.4% 30.2% 32.1% 38.2% 38.1% 45.1% 48.6%
Besuki 3,354 3,245 2,971 2,762 2,502 2,386 2,228 38.3% 39.7% 38.5% 43.8% 50.0% 52.8% 51.8%
Madura 2,049 2,105 2,033 1,893 1,892 1,508 1,359 9.7% 9.3% 7.9% 9.6% 9.1% 9.1% 10.6%
East Java 2,108 2,247 2,052 1,784 1,389 1,285 1,329 33.8% 31.8% 30.7% 35.0% 42.3% 42.7% 41.5%
Total Java 1,961 2,068 1,918 1,679 1,316 1,322 1,308 43.4% 40.7% 39.8% 44.1% 47.8% 45.2% 47.4%
Note: Calculations did not account for trade across Residency borders and - unlike Table A.3.1 - imports and exports of rice to/from Java. 
Total, Kcal per Capita per Day % Calories from Rice
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